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When enforcement resources are limited, how should the scarce
enforcement resources be allocated to increase compliance with the law?
The answer to this question can determine to what extent the law on the
books translates to the law in practice. A dominant school of thought in the
tax literature suggests that they should be allocated based on a "worst-first"
method, whereby the individuals likely to be most noncompliant are targeted
However, while "worst-first" methods can encourage all individuals to
increase compliance so as not to be deemed the "worst, " they can also
provide cover to engage in noncompliance that is perceived moderate for the
relevant population. This dynamic can become most problematic in highly
noncompliant populations. In such populations, existing, high levels of
noncompliance, and underlying, structural causes of the high noncompliance
can serve as coordinating mechanisms, providing mutual assurance of low
compliance. Moreover, "worst-first" theories do not provide a
comprehensive explanation for the group and project-based enforcement
practices that are found in a number of actual enforcement settings. In
response to these deficits, this Article draws on work from across different
disciplines to develop a new theory for the allocation of scarce tax
enforcement resources. This Article suggests that, under certain conditions,
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deterrence can be enhanced by allocating scarce enforcement resources
among a low-compliance population of taxpayers through a process called
concentrated enforcement. After setting forth the theoretical case for
concentrated enforcement, this Article examines how it might apply in the
cash business tax sector, a highly noncompliant sector that presents
particular challenges for "worst-first" methods. This Article concludes that
concentrated enforcement may increase compliance, meriting its application
and empirical evaluation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Classic deterrence theory, the foundational economic theory
frequently relied upon by legal scholars to describe how to use enforcement
to increase deterrence and therefore compliance with the law, offers two
basic prescriptions for increasing legal compliance: increasing the likelihood
of detection and increasing the penalty for noncompliance.' Guided by this
theory, law and economics scholars have focused for decades on setting the
optimal likelihood of detection and penalties for noncompliance.2 However,
when practical constraints limit both the likelihood of detection and penalties
1. See infra text accompanying notes 14-16.
2. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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to suboptimal levels, these two levers offer little by way of useful
prescriptions for increasing compliance in practice.
Focusing on the practical constraints on enforcement, a strain of
thought in the tax literature and other enforcement contexts suggests that
scarce enforcement resources should be allocated based on a "worst-first"
method, which targets enforcement toward individuals likely to be most
noncompliant. Indeed, this "worst-first" method seems to underlie the well-
known Discriminant Index Function score, or "DIF" score,4 which many
think is the principal means of determining which taxpayers to audit.s
However, this "worst-first" theory does not provide a comprehensive
approach to the allocation of scarce enforcement resources. While "worst-
first" approaches may be a good way to select the most noncompliant
individuals, using only a "worst-first" approach may not be the best means of
incentivizing voluntary compliance.6 Indeed, "worst-first" methods are least
likely to work well as a means of incentivizing voluntary compliance when
noncompliance in a given population is particularly high-the very situations
in which allocation of scarce enforcement resources are most important.
Moreover "worst-first" theories do not provide an explanation for the
project-based enforcement that often exists in practice.
In response to these deficits in existing theory, this Article sets forth
a theory for the allocation of scarce tax enforcement resources, which this
Article calls concentrated enforcement. Concentrated enforcement is an
initial process for allocating scarce enforcement resources among a highly
noncompliant population. It is a method of segmentation and rotation. It
breaks a highly noncompliant population into subsectors and addresses the
population's compliance problem through strategic, concentrated
"enforcement projects" in the subsectors. Enforcement projects in particular
subsectors are necessarily matched by decreases in enforcement in others.
The enforcement projects rotate through the subsectors, with their initiation
announced, but their withdrawals unannounced. If particularly high
noncompliance nodes can be identified, they receive heightened attention.
Concentrated enforcement is different than a purely "worst-first" approach
because concentrated enforcement segments an overall population and
focuses on enforcement projects within the population, even if individuals
outside of the enforcement project might exhibit higher noncompliance. The
intuition behind concentrated enforcement is that, under certain
circumstances, concentrated enforcement can increase compliance as a result
3. See infra text accompanying notes 38-40.
4. See I.R.M. § 4.1.3.2(2) (2007).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 54-55.
7. See infra text following note 55.
8. See infra Part III.
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of (1) increasing marginal returns to enforcement and (2) psychological
factors that can support concentrated enforcement.
This Article develops the theoretical case for concentrated
enforcement by drawing on, and integrating research from, a number of
different disciplines. First, by drawing on and amplifying recent economic
theory, this Article argues that if compliance incentives are inadequate if
enforcement is spread uniformly, a base case for concentrated enforcement
can apply.9 Informed by criminology, behavioral economics, and
psychology, this Article then argues that, under a number of different
circumstances, the case for concentrated enforcement grows. The case for
concentrated enforcement grows when there are feedback loops between
noncompliance and enforcement, when norms can yield and sustain
compliance but themselves depend on rates of compliance, and when the
regulated parties exhibit the availability bias or uncertainty aversion.'0
Finally, when particular nodes of noncompliance exist, concentrated
enforcement works best by focusing on such nodes."
After setting forth the theory behind concentrated enforcement, this
Article examines how it might apply to the cash business tax sector. The cash
business tax sector is an important sector for innovation, because cash
business taxpayers engage in extensive violations of the tax law, which are
difficult to address with classic deterrence theory or "worst-first" methods.
This Article concludes that, for a number of reasons, concentrated
enforcement may increase the total amount of compliance in the cash
business tax sector.12
On the other hand, there are some potential problems with the
application of concentrated enforcement to the cash business tax sector.
These include: fundamental difficulties with auditing cash business
taxpayers, potential compliance decay, potential taxpayer entrenchment to
tax evasion positions, and possible backlash as a result of perceived targeting
of taxpayers.13 Despite these potential problems, this Article suggests that
the case for concentrated enforcement in the cash business tax sector is
strong enough to merit experimental application and evaluation.
The claim of this Article is not that concentrated enforcement would
work best in the cash business tax sector, as compared to alternative sectors.
Rather, this Article seeks to set forth the conditions under which
concentrated enforcement may increase compliance and examine how it
might apply in a particularly difficult compliance environment: the cash
business tax sector. Whether the conditions necessary for the success of
9. See infra text accompanying notes 96-117.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 133-46.
11. See infra page Part IV.G.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 179-24.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 225-68.
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concentrated enforcement in fact exist in any particular sector, including in
the cash business tax sector, is ultimately an empirical question. However,
understanding which conditions would make concentrated enforcement
successful and whether the available evidence suggests the existence of such
conditions is the first, necessary step in making informed decisions about
when to test concentrated enforcement in an experimental application.
Moreover, the question addressed in this Article of when concentrated
enforcement will work is not merely theoretical. As explored in this Article,
project-based enforcement already exists in practice. Better understanding of
when and why such enforcement might work is essential in order to guide
and improve the existing project-based tax enforcement.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the existing tax
scholarship regarding deterrence and "worst-first" methods for the allocation
of scarce enforcement resources. Part III illustrates how, in practice, recent
criminal and tax enforcement has relied on project-based enforcement. Part
IV explores the conditions under which concentrated enforcement can
increase compliance. Part V examines how concentrated enforcement would
apply to the cash business tax sector and concludes.
II. CLASSIC DETERRENCE THEORY AND "WORST-FIRST" METHODS
This Article builds upon existing theories of deterrence, including
classic deterrence theory and "worst-first" methods for allocating scarce
enforcement resources. As a result, this Part provides background regarding
classic deterrence theory and "worst-first" methods. This Part also illustrates
how neither of these theories provide a comprehensive approach to the
allocation of scarce tax enforcement resources.
A. Classic Deterrence Theory
Legal scholars have traditionally relied upon classic deterrence
theory to explain how to use enforcement to increase compliance with the
law. In modem legal scholarship, classic deterrence theory dates back to the
work of Gary Becker.14 Becker described that deterrence is a function of two
factors: the likelihood that a violation of the law is detected, and the penalties
if the violation is detected.'" As a result, Becker's work dictates that the two
14. Becker's work had its roots in earlier work by Beccaria, Bentham, and
others. See, e.g., Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments, in ALESSANDRO
MANZONI, THE COLUMN OF INFAMY PREFACED BY CESARE BECCARIA'S OF CRIMES
AND PUNISHMENTS (Kenelm Foster & Jane Grigson trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1964)
(1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 158-59 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
15. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968) [hereinafter Becker, Crime and Punishment].
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principal means of increasing deterrence are: increasing the likelihood of
detection (principally through greater enforcement resources) and increasing
the severity of penalties for violating the law. This basic theory ("classic
deterrence theory") and the two factors at the heart of it have spawned
decades of scholarship.16 Tax compliance scholarship reflects the heavy
influence of classic deterrence theory, with numerous articles written on how
to increase the likelihood of detection for tax noncompliance,17 and what the
penalties should be for noncompliance."
To be sure, an important line of tax scholarship (and compliance
scholarship generally) has argued that deterrence and its accompanying
facilitator, enforcement, are not the only means of increasing compliance
with the law. In vast literature, scholars have suggested that a variety of non-
deterrence based theories are important in understanding and engendering
compliance. For example, scholars have suggested that norms,20 morale, 2 1
16. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICs 404, 405 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, The Theory
of Public Enforcement of Law] (discussing the importance of Becker's work to the
development of law enforcement); Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance,
81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1331, 1345 (2006) (explaining that Becker's "neoclassical
approach to public enforcement has constituted one of the most extensively farmed
fields in law and economics").
17. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax
Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1671 (2009) [hereinafter Blank,
Overcoming Overdisclosure] (examining ways to solve overdisclosure, which
interferes with IRS's ability to detect problematic transactions); Alex Raskolnikov,
Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting
Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 569, 599 (2006) [hereinafter Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation] (examining how to increase likelihood of detection for
inconspicuous noncompliance).
18. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case
for Moderate Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453 (2011); Sarah B. Lawsky,
Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017 (2009)
[hereinafter Lawsky, Probably]; Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and
Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241 (2007) [hereinafter
Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance]; Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty
Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229 (Wolfgang Schin ed., 2008).
19. For good summaries of this literature, see Michael Doran, Tax Penalties
and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 111, 131-38 (2009); Alex Raskolnikov,
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 689, 697-701 (2009) [hereinafter Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices].
20. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 914 (1996).
21. Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional
Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136, 137 (2007).
[Vol. 16:6330
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reciprocity, 22 signaling,23 and a variety of other mechanisms are important.
However, the non-deterrence theories have, if anything, complemented, but
not supplanted, the importance of deterrence as a principal means of ensuring
compliance with the law. 24
The problem is that classic deterrence theory's traditional, and
hugely influential, formulation of deterrence often does not work well in
practice.25 While increasing the likelihood of detection or the size of
penalties may be very sensible theoretical means of increasing compliance,
practical limitations often seriously constrain the ability to do so. Increasing
the likelihood of detection can sometimes be done through clever
enforcement innovations, such as information reporting regimes. Indeed, for
the many taxpayers who only have income that is subject to information
reporting and withholding, or both, these mechanisms can ensure extremely
high levels of compliance.26 But, for the remaining taxpayers, such as cash
business taxpayers, who cannot be reached by these information reporting
regimes, increasing the likelihood of detection often requires the allocation
of additional enforcement resources. Yet, like many enforcement agencies,
22. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REv. 333,
343 (2001).
23. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance,
86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000).
24. While the relationship between deterrence and non-deterrence theories
is outside the scope of this Article, it is worthwhile to note that a strong argument
exists that deterrence still does much of the work in motivating tax compliance. See
Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 38-39 (2007) [hereinafter Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves]. Moreover, to
the extent that non-deterrence theories operate, they seem to work in conjunction
with, and, to some extent, depend on, the functionality of deterrence. See, e.g.,
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1484-89 (2003) (making this argument)
[hereinafter Lederman, The Interplay] (making this argument).
25. These practical constraints are by no means limited to the tax context,
although the tax context provides a useful illustration. See, e.g., Michael G. Faure &
Marjolein Visser, Law and Economics of Environmental Crime, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC CRIME 57, 61 (Hans Sj6gren & Goran Skagh eds.,
2004) (review of law and economics of environmental crime describing "relatively
low detection rate of environmental pollution and . . . the fact that the maximum
punishments provided for in legislation are almost never imposed by judges in
western European countries").
26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OVERVIEW OF TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR
2006, http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview-tax gap_2006.pdf [hereinafter,
OVERVIEW OF TAX GAP] (net misreporting percentage of one percent for income
subject to substantial information reporting and withholding).
27. Becker, Crime and Punishment, supra note 15, at 180-84. An
alternative approach to increasing information reporting for these taxpayers would
be the introduction of a value-added tax ("VAT"), which can create a paper trail that
2014] 331
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the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") is perpetually underfunded.2 8 The
staggeringly low individual audit rate of approximately one percent is a
29 Bce isl
symptom of these enforcement limitations. Indeed, Becker himself
anticipated such problems, prescribing that raising penalties can be a
substitute for increasing the likelihood of detection. 30 However, in many
situations, noncompliance penalties in practice are quite low, and certainly
too low to make up for the low probability of detection. For example, the
size of tax penalties is far too low to make up for the low likelihood of
detection, and political unease with substantially higher penalties suggests
that they are likely to remain inadequate. 3 Moreover, while tax scholars
have engaged in extensive discussions of whether tax penalties should be
strict liability or fault-based, 2 the history of tax penalties and strong
adherence to a fault-based system suggest that a wholesale move to strict
may increase compliance. Itai Grinberg, Where Credit Is Due: Advantages of the
Credit-Invoice Method for a Partial Replacement VAT, 63 TAX L. REV. 309, 314
(2010) (discussing how "VAT invoices create a paper trail that gives tax authorities
an independent source of information . . . [that] can help the tax authorities enforce
the VAT"). This Article operates within existing political constraints which, at least
at present, have not been consistent with the creation of a VAT in the United States.
Additionally, the VAT is not a compliance panacea. Rather, enforcement problems
remain, which have to be policed. Graeme Cooper, The Discrete Charm of the VAT
14-16, Social Science Research Network, Nov. 27, 2007, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=1027512. The allocation of scarce enforcement resources
discussed in this Article is an issue that would apply regardless of the underlying tax
base.
28. See, e.g., 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE: 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 34-41 (2012), http://www.
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/FY-2012-Annual-Report-
To-Congress-Full-Report (identifying chronic underfunding of IRS and the resulting
limitations on its enforcement and other capabilities).
29. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE DATA BOOK 2012, at 22 tbl.9a, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/l2databk.pdf
[hereinafter IRS DATA BOOK 2012].
30. Becker, Crime and Punishment, supra note 15, at 193.
31. See, e.g., Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance, supra note 18, at 292
("Although it is an interesting theoretical possibility, Congress will never in fact
adopt a tax penalty regime that would impose a $9900 penalty for a tax
underpayment of $100. Given this fact, we are probably limited to tax penalties that
are far lower than the Bentham-Becker ideal, though it is difficult to deny that the
normal penalty should be greater than the current 20 percent of the tax
underpayments."). This penalty dynamic applies in situations in which there is not
adequate information reporting, as is the case in the cash business tax sector.
32. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18.
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liability penalties is unlikely.33 As a result, classic deterrence theory's
persistent focus on determining optimal enforcement levels and penalties,
rather than contemplating deterrence in light of suboptimal enforcement
parameters,34 leaves unanswered the crucial question of how to allocate
scarce, and suboptimal, enforcement resources.
Tax scholars have suggested a number of innovative means of
optimizing the use of constrained enforcement resources. For instance,
Leandra Lederman has suggested allocating low levels of enforcement,
potentially combined with norms-based appeals, to Wage and Investment
Income taxpayers, but high levels of enforcement to cash businesses, because
of the two groups' observable and significantly different levels of
compliance.35 Joshua Blank has explored the potential gains from publicizing
successful enforcement efforts against celebrities and other prominent
taxpayers in order to capitalize on salience and anchoring effects. Alex
Raskolnikov has advocated creating different taxpayer regimes because of
different taxpayers presumably being motivated by different compliance
37incentives. However, all of these ideas depend, to some extent, on
differences between taxpayers, and they suggest allocating enforcement
resources (or publicity, or incentives) based on such differences. They leave
open the question of how resources should be allocated among the remaining
population of highly noncompliant, not necessarily distinguishable taxpayers,
such as cash business taxpayers who do not opt into a cooperative regime.
B. " Worst-First " Theories
In answering this question, the tax compliance literature (as well as
scholars in other, similar enforcement contexts) 38 has focused on a "worst-
33. Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64
TAX L. REv. 489, 516-19 (2011) [hereinafter Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic
Tax Law Uncertainty].
34. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, supra note 16, at 412 (assuming away such limitations and suggesting, in
response to suboptimal enforcement and penalties, that "society probably should
raise levels of deterrence").
35. Lederman, The Interplay, supra note 24, at 1500-13.
36. Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J.
265, 294, 297-98, 302 (2011) [hereinafter Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax
Privacy].
37. Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices, supra note 19.
38. For instance, Margaret Lemos and Alex Stein have developed a strategy
called "strategic enforcement," whereby enforcement resources are used to target the
worst violators. Rather than focusing on particular locations or particularly
problematic sectors, strategic enforcement targets the worst offenders, or outliers.
Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MNN. L. REv. 9, 18
(2010) [hereinafter Lemos & Stein, Strategic Enforcement]; see also Rachel A.
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first" method. "Worst-first" methods seek to target the individuals who are
likely to be most noncompliant. These methods can take a number of
different forms, such as focusing on taxpayers who fail to report at least
some threshold of tax liability,3 9 focusing greater retroactive or future audit
attention on taxpayers found to have evaded, or focusing on taxpayers whose
tax profiles are sufficiently outside of expectations.40 Indeed, the last
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (2009) (advocating a "worst-first" policy of suing the worst, large police
departments). Lemos and Stein even explicitly describe how the use of a DIF score
to "red flag" taxpayers is a prime example of strategic enforcement. Lemos & Stein,
Strategic Enforcement, supra, at 28-29. Scholars often apply "worst-first" analysis
in related contexts, such as environmental regulation. See, e.g., Winston Harrington,
Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J. PUB. EcoN. 29 (1988).
39. It is possible to characterize the threshold approach as "worst-first" or
not as "worst-first," depending on the outcome. If all taxpayers who have tax
liability in excess of the threshold report tax liability that exceeds the threshold, then
the IRS would only be auditing taxpayers who truly have tax liability below the
threshold, arguably not a "worst-first" approach. But see Michael J. Graetz et al.,
The Tax Compliance Game: Toward An Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1986) [Graetz et al., The Tax Compliance Game] for a
discussion of problems with the IRS's ability to commit to an audit rule. However, if
some taxpayers with tax liability in excess of the threshold nonetheless report tax
liability below the threshold, then the IRS would only be auditing (and assessing
additional tax and penalties owed for) taxpayers who did not at least report the
threshold and who could be considered the "worst" underreporters.
40. A wide array of literature has examined variations of these tactics. For
instance, an early line of literature focused on interactions between taxpayer
reporting decisions and IRS auditing decisions and modeled various "worst-first"
strategies. See, e.g., James Alm et al., Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit
Selection Rules, 46 KYKLOS 27 (1993) (comparing conditional audit rules and
random audit rules); Graetz et al., The Tax Compliance Game, supra note 39
(introducing game-theoretic approach whereby the IRS, as a strategic actor,
conditions its audit rules on taxpayer reports); Joseph Greenberg, Avoiding Tax
Avoidance: A (Repeated) Game-Theoretic Approach, 32 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1984)
(applying game-theoretic approach whereby taxpayers are placed in one of three
audit groups, based on audit status); Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson,
Incentive Generating State Dependent Penalty System, 19 J. PUB. ECoN. 333 (1982)
(analyzing audit results determining probability of future audits); Jennifer F.
Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Income Tax Compliance in a Principal-Agent
Framework, 26 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1985) (setting forth cutoff method); J.A. Rickard et
al., A Tax Evasion Model With Allowance for Retroactive Penalties, 58 ECON. REC.
379 (1982) (examining a system whereby audit results determine whether back
audits occur). More recent literature has also focused on "worst-first" methods. See,
e.g., James Alm & Michael McKee, Tax Compliance as a Coordination Game, 54 J.
ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 297, 298 (2004) [hereinafter Alm & McKee, Tax Compliance
as a Coordination Game] (examining audit policy when returns are selected based
on deviation from average and exploring impact of taxpayer communication); Kim
334 [Vol. 16:6
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mentioned iteration of this method (auditing those whose tax profiles are
sufficiently outside of expectations) is often cited as the IRS's principal
means of choosing which taxpayers to audit through the DIF score.
While the IRS's auditing strategies are shrouded in secrecy,41 various
government authorities have indicated that the IRS uses the DIF score as a
primary method to determine which taxpayers to audit. 42 The DIF score
employs a "worst-first" approach by focusing on taxpayers who are likely to
be the most noncompliant, as determined by deviation from others.43 The
IRS has described that the DIF score rates tax returns based on their
"potential for [tax] change, based on past IRS experience with similar
returns."44 The General Accounting Office, now the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO"), has explained that DIF scores "are
automatically calculated for all filed individual returns" and that this
"calculation is based on a series of formulas developed by the IRS that are
designed to indicate the returns that have the highest probability of a tax
change if audited." 4 5
Bloomquist, Tax Compliance as an Evolutionary Coordination Game: An Agent-
Based Approach, 39 PUB. FIN. REV. 25, 40 (2011) [hereinafter Bloomquist, Tax
Compliance] (modeling tax compliance in an agent-based framework, using a
modified-DIF approach); Scott M. Gilpatric, Regulatory Enforcement with
Competitive Endogenous Audit Mechanisms, 42 RAND J. EcON. 292 (2011)
(examining (in related, environmental context) endogenous audit mechanisms in
experimental setting and finding benefits of contemporaneous relative comparisons);
Dmitri Romanov, Costs and Benefits of Marginal Reallocation of Tax Agency
Resources in Pursuing the Hard-to-Tax, in TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX 187 (James
Alm et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX] (exploring means of
determining marginal assessments for different enforcement strategies).
41. See I.R.M. § 4.19.11.1.5.1(8)-(9) (2007) (describing that "DIF
mathematical formulas are confidential in nature and are distributed to IRS
personnel only on a need-to-know basis" and that "DIF formulas are for official use
only and will not be discussed with unauthorized personnel").
42. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-30, TAX
ADMINISTRATION IRS' RETURN SELECTION PROCESS (1999) [hereinafter IRS'
RETURN SELECTION PROCESS] (indicating that 59% of the closed books and records
audits of returns received in 1992, 1993, and 1994 were selected using the DIF
score); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FACT SHEET 2006-10, THE EXAMINATION
(AUDIT) PROCESS, (January 2006), http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Examination-
(Audit)-Process [hereinafter THE EXAMINATION (AUDIT) PROCESS]; see also William
Hoffman, IRS Doesn't Target Small Businesses for Audits, Werfel Says, 2013 TAX
NOTES TODAY 138-2 (July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Hoffman, IRS Doesn't Target]
(recently discussing use of DIF score).
43. Bloomquist, Tax Compliance, supra note 40, at 40 ("The goal of IRS
DIF methodology is the same-to identify the least compliant taxpayers for audit.").
44. THE EXAMINATION (AUDIT) PROCESS, supra note 42; see also I.R.M. §
4.19.11.1.5.1 (2007) (describing how DIF score works).
45. IRS' RETURN SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 42, at 2.
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As implied from the above description, the DIF score focuses on the
direct revenue yield from audit, allocating resources based on the tax liability
that would be paid as a result of audit.4 6 Evidence suggests that the DIF score
is likely a cost effective way to allocate audit resources toward taxpayers
likely to owe the most on audit. Prior to the DIF score, the IRS had no
systematic way to determine which returns were likely to produce the highest
yield on audit, and the IRS used significant time and resources to make these
determinations. 47 Early evaluations of the DIF score revealed that it
significantly raised the average yield per return audited.4 8 The same research
showed the DIF score vastly superior to random selection, again as measured
in terms of average tax yield per return audited.49
However, the more important (and unanswered) question is whether
the DIF score maximizes overall compliance (inclusive of individuals not
actually audited).50 Researchers have concluded that the indirect yield from
audit (from taxpayers who are not audited increasing their tax liability) is
46. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GGD-76-55, How
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE SELECTS INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR
AUDIT 28 (Nov. 5, 1976) [hereinafter HOW THE IRS SELECTS]; IRS' RETURN
SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 42, at 2; THE EXAMINATION (AUDIT) PROCESS,
supra note 42 (indicating that "IRS personnel screen the highest-scoring returns,
selecting some for audit and identifying the items on these returns that are most
likely to need review"); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT.
818, 826 (1998) [hereinafter Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance] (explaining that "the
IRS develops its infamous DIF score for the explicit purpose of identifying those
returns within a given audit class with the highest potential audit yield").
47. IRS' RETURN SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 42, at 3-4 (describing
how, before the advent of the DIF score, the "IRS had no systematic way to evaluate
which among all filed returns had the greatest potential for changes to the reported
tax if audited," and instead had to rely "on its auditors across the country to identify
which returns to audit by using their experience and judgment in reviewing returns"
which was a time consuming and resources intensive process).
48. HOW THE IRS SELECTS, supra note 46, at 29, 34.
49. Id. at 31, 34.
50. This Article is focused on the compliance within a particular tax sector,
such as, for example, cash business taxpayers. This Article does not address
allocations of resources between different sectors of taxpayers. As a result, when
discussing maximizing overall compliance, this Article is focused on maximizing the
overall compliance of taxpayers within the particular tax sector. The assumption is
that there is a fixed amount of enforcement resources that can be applied to the given
tax sector, and the question is how to allocate the enforcement resources within that
tax sector so as to maximize the compliance of taxpayers within that tax sector. For
reasons that will be fleshed out in footnote 107 and the accompanying text,




many times the direct yield from audit.5' Additionally, the total amount of
revenue collected from all taxpayers dwarfs the amount collected as a result
of enforcement. 5 2 As a result, determining that the DIF score does a good job
of maximizing direct yield from audit does not necessarily establish that the
DIF score is the best tool to allocate scarce enforcement resources, because it
does not address the other, more significant question of voluntary
compliance. Focusing on maximizing direct revenue from audit, to the
exclusion of voluntary compliance, may be quite counterproductive.53
"Worst-first" methods do not necessarily maximize overall
compliance. While "worst-first" methods (such as the DIF score) can, under
certain circumstances, incentivize all regulated individuals to increase their
compliance, so as not to be the "worst,"54 they can also convey the relative
safety of engaging in moderate levels of evasion with little likelihood of
51. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement
Activities and Taxpayer Noncompliance, 2012, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/04dubin.pdf [hereinafter Dubin, Criminal Investigation] (estimating indirect
effect of doubling the audit rate to be almost 94 percent of the total revenue effect);
Alan H. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance:
Estimating the Impacts of Tax Policy, Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness 35,
1996, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/publ916b.pdf [hereinafter Plumley, The
Determinants ofIndividual Income] (estimating that indirect yield from audit is 11.6
times the direct yield from audit); see also James Alm et al., Getting the Word Out:
Enforcement Information Dissemination and Compliance Behavior, 93 J. PUB.
ECON. 392, 394 (2009) [hereinafter Alm et al., Getting the Word Out] (finding
indirect effect on compliance 4.4 times the direct effect in an experimental setting).
52. For instance, in 2012, gross collection of tax, net of refunds, was
approximately $2.15 trillion. IRS DATA BOOK 2012, supra note 29, at 3 tbl. 1. The
total recommended additional tax after examination for returns examined in 2012
was approximately $38.7 billion. Id. at 23 tbl. 9a.
53. See, e.g., Janet G. McCubbin, Optimal Tax Enforcement: A Review of
the Literature and Practical Implications 20-21 (OTA Working Paper No. 90,
2004), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/
ota90.pdf [hereinafter McCubbin, Optimal Tax Enforcement] (discussing how IRS
enforcement policies are designed to minimize the number of audits that produce no
change in tax liability, but how such a policy might be misguided because an
enforcement policy that increased total compliance may also increase the no change
rate); see also Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, Behavioral Responses to Taxpayer
Audits: Evidence from Random Taxpayer Inquiries, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 33, 34 (2012)
[hereinafter Gemmell & Ratto, Behavioral Responses] ("Despite an extensive
literature on tax evasion in general, the literature on how taxpayers' compliance
behavior responds to auditing is more limited.").
54. Lemos & Stein, Strategic Enforcement, supra note 38. This has roots in
the economics of tournaments literature. See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin




getting caught." This dynamic can be particularly problematic when
compliance is very low, because, in such cases, regulated individuals can
safely engage in high noncompliance, without attracting attention.
Additionally, if the regulated individuals can coordinate on noncompliance,
they can defeat the effectiveness of "worst-first" methods. Indeed, James
Alm and Michael McKee examined experimentally how regulated
individuals may communicate with each other to keep compliance low,
thereby disabling the power of a "worst-first" method to produce
compliance. One (unexplored) implication of this finding is that when
certain underlying features of a compliance landscape (such as high
difficulty in detecting noncompliance) make enforcement difficult, the
regulated individuals may be able to rely on each other not to comply, or to
comply at low levels, without having to directly coordinate their
noncompliance. In other words, these features may serve as a substitute for
direct communication regarding noncompliance. As a result, somewhat
paradoxically, compliance landscapes most in need of enforcement
innovations may be least affected by "worst-first" strategies.
III. PROJECT-BASED ENFORCEMENT IN PRACTICE
Notwithstanding the extensive focus on "worst-first" methods in the
tax literature, actual enforcement practices both in and outside of the tax
context rely not only on "worst-first" methods, but also on group or project-
based enforcement. This Part explores examples of group or project-based
enforcement found in a number of different contexts.
Perhaps the most empirically tested, recent example of group or
project-based enforcement comes from the criminology context, in the form
of "hot spots policing." As defined by criminologists Anthony Braga and
David Weisburd, hot spots policing "is the application of police interventions
at very small geographic units of analysis."s? Braga and Weisburd explain
that "[i]t does not sound like a very radical innovation, but indeed it
represents a major reform not only in how the police organize to do
something about crime, but also in how scholars define and understand the
crime problem."ss Hot spots policing arose out of empirical evidence that
crimes tend to concentrate in particular places. Based on this insight,
55. Gemmell & Ratto, Behavioral Responses, supra note 53, at 53-54
(exploring based on UK data how eliminating random audits, in favor of risk-based
audits, could substantially reduce revenue as a result of essentially immunizing low-
risk taxpayers).
56. Alm & McKee, Tax Compliance as a Coordination Game, supra note
40.
57. ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM
PLACES 9 (2010) [hereinafter BRAGA & WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES].
58. Id. at 9-10.
338 [Vol. 16:6
Concentrated Enforcement
criminologists have shown that concentrating police patrol on small crime
hot spots can significantly decrease crime. Indeed, in addition to finding
that hot spots policing can prevent crime in the hot spots,60 studies have
61found that hot spots policing can also decrease crime in surrounding areas.
These findings have been particularly encouraging, in contrast to an early
policing study in Kansas City. The Kansas City study found that increasing
59. For a small sample of this literature, see Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J.
Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46
CRIMINOLOGY 577 (2008); Anthony Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in
Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Control Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541
(1999) [hereinafter Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing]; Rafael Di Tella &
Ernesto Schargrodsky, Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of
Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 114 (2004); Lorraine
Green & Jan Roehl, Civil Remedies and Crime Prevention: An Introduction, in CIVIL
REMEDIES AND CRIME PREVENTION (Lorraine Green Mazerale & Jan Roehl eds.,
1998) [hereinafter Green & Roehl, CIVIL REMEDIES]; Christopher Koper, Just
Enough Police Presence: Reducing Crime and Disorderly Behavior by Optimizing
Patrol Time in Crime Hot Spots, 12 JusT. Q. 649 (1995); Lawrence Sherman &
David Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime Hot Spots: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995); David Weisburd & Lorraine
Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City DMA Experiment, 12 JUST. Q. 711
(1995) [hereinafter Weisburd & Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots]. A number of
independent, meta research studies have synthesized the various work done on hot
spots policing. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS,
WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING, A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (1997), www.ncjrs.gov/works/;
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE (Wesley Skogan &
Kathleen Frydl eds., National Research Council 2004); ANTHONY BRAGA ET AL.,
THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, HOT SPOTS POLICING EFFECTS ON CRIME (2012).
60. See, e.g., BRAGA & WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES, supra note
57, at 100 (2010) ("Using scientific evaluation evidence as a criterion, we find
substantial support for the crime prevention effectiveness of hot spots policing.");
Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of Recent Evidence
[hereinafter Apel & Nagin, General Deterrence], in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 411,
421 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011) [hereinafter CRIME AND PUBLIC
POLICY] (citing hot spots policing as a method that has been shown to be effective at
preventing crime); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New
Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
271, 314 (2006) ("[T]argeting police resources against the highest-crime 'hot spots'
can also help prevent criminal activity.").
61. See, e.g., Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing, supra note 59;
Ronald V. Clarke & David Weisburd, Difusion of Crime Control Benefits:
Observations on the Reverse ofDisplacement, in 2 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 165
(1994); Green & Roehl, CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 59; Lawrence Sherman &
Dennis Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: 'Hot Spots' Patrol in




police patrol across large patrol beats did not have a substantial, preventative
effect on crime. 62 The combination of the hot spots policing research and the
Kansas City study suggests that concentration, and not just the level, of
enforcement can be critical in producing deterrence.
A separate line of criminological work has developed more
anecdotal evidence that focusing enforcement resources on particular
problems at particular times can be an effective allocation of enforcement
resources. Criminologist Mark Kleiman has described a number of such
examples. For instance, in the early 1990s, the illegal practice of
"squeegeeing," or cleaning windshields and then asking to be paid, plagued
New York City. The problem seemed both too rampant and, at the same
time, insignificant, to be controlled by the use of normal enforcement
resources. 63 However, New York City announced a highly publicized zero-
tolerance policy for squeegeeing, in which the police would use all
enforcement resources necessary to stop the squeegeeing.64 As Kleiman
describes it, the heightened enforcement pressure stopped the squeegeeing,
not only on a short-term basis, but over the long term as well.6 5 Drastically
reducing the amount of squeegeeing allowed the police to maintain
compliance through the use of normal, low-enforcement resources.
Kleiman has described similar successes in other contexts, including,
for example, with H.O.P.E., or Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with
67Enforcement. Facing a constrained probation system that lacked the
capacity to punish and therefore deter drug use by probationers, one judge
created H.O.P.E. The program notified chronic parole violators that they
would be punished for all of their probation infractions, in contrast to the
prior practice of punishing only persistent and severe violations, or both.
62. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report,
George L. Kelling et al., Police Foundation, 1974, http://www.policefoundation.org/
content/kansas-city-preventive-patrol-experiment-0.
63. MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILs 41-42 (2009)
[hereinafter KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS].
64. Id This policy is different than the well-known "broken windows"
policy that the New York City Police Department put in place in the 1980s. Broken
windows policing is based on the notion that stopping minor offenses could
discourage more serious offenses. James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at
29. The zero-tolerance policing with squeegeeing, on the other hand, was based on
the notion that promising to stop squeegeeing on a short-term basis would ensure
that it would be stopped on a longer-term basis. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE
FAILS, supra note 63, at 43.
65. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS, supra note 63, at 43.
66.Id
67. HOPE PROBATION, HAWAII STATE JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.
hi.us/special_projects/hope/about hopeprobation.html (last visited May 1, 2013).
68. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS, supra note 63, at 34-39.
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The warnings alone did much of the work for the program, which resulted in
more than a 90 percent reduction in violation rate among H.O.P.E parolees,
as compared to an increase in violations for probationers not in the
program.69
Stories like these also helped inspire the work of David Kennedy.
Kennedy instituted programs to stop gang violence in cities around the
United States. Begun as Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Kennedy's program
relied on heavy, focused concentrations of enforcement resources, combined
with advance announcements to stop gang violence. While it has been hard
to develop strong empirical evidence regarding Kennedy's work,o it again
highlights the use and potential benefits of strategies that rely on groups or
projects, rather than a purely individual, "worst-first" method. To be clear,
instead of focusing on the "worst" offenders (i.e., the biggest drug dealers,
the most frequent squeegeers, the most severe parole violators), these efforts
focused on particular groups or projects.
69. Id at 39-41.
70. For extensive description of this work, see DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON'T
SHOOT 44-75 (2011) [hereinafter KENNEDY, DON'T SHOOT]. While Operation
Ceasefire, and various iterations of it in other cities, were often accompanied by a
decline in the crime at issue, the large number of variables has made it difficult to
say, with certainty, whether Operation Ceasefire and its progeny actually caused the
declines in crime. Id. at 80 (explaining some of the academic skepticism about the
program); Anthony A. Braga & Christopher Winship, Partnership, Accountability,
and Innovation: Clarfying Boston's Experience with Pulling Levers, in POLICE
INNOVATION, 171, 174-78 (David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006)
(discussing doubts about empirical proof for Kennedy's pulling levers strategy);
Apel & Nagin, General Deterrence, supra note 60, at 422 (discussing some of the
ambiguity about whether Operation Ceasefire caused a decline in crime but coming
to the conclusion that it played a role, and also suggesting that Operation Ceasefire
"illustrates the potential for combining elements of both certainty and severity
enhancement to generate a targeted deterrent effect"). Similarly, a line of work
regarding drug market enforcement projects has claimed some success, though not
without question regarding the empirics of the successes. Mark A.R. Kleiman,
Crackdowns: The Effects of Intensive Enforcement on Retail Heroin Dealing, in
STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT: EXAMINING THE ISSUES 3, 4-17 (Marcia R.
Chaiken, U.S. Department of Justice ed., 1988) [hereinafter STREET-LEVEL DRUG
ENFORCEMENT] (discussing apparent successes of drug market enforcement projects
in Lynn, Massachusetts and Alphabet City, New York City, but also apparent failure
in Lawrence, Massachusetts); Arnold Barnett, Drug Crackdowns and Crime Rates:
A Comment on the Kleiman Report, in STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT, supra,
at 35 (questioning apparent success in Lynn, Massachusetts); Anthony V. Bouza,
Evaluating Street-Level Drug Enforcement, in STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT,
supra, at 43 (offering a much more pessimistic account); see also Lawrence W.
Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME & JUST. 1,




Even in the tax enforcement context, individual "worst-first"
methods do not comprehensively explain auditing practices, which include
an element of project-based approaches, in addition to use of the DIF score.
Indeed, as this Article will discuss in more detail later, the IRS has engaged
in enforcement projects directed at various groups of taxpayers and at
specific tax issues.n In accordance with this practice, the IRS has publicly
indicated that it "may identify returns for examination in connection with
local compliance projects."72 Other countries, such as the United Kingdom,
have been engaging in tax enforcement projects that are perhaps most
consistent with concentrated enforcement.73 For instance, in 2007, the United
Kingdom's tax authority, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs ("HMRC"),
began a series of highly publicized tax campaigns, which focused the tax
authority's resources on specific populations.74 The campaigns give members
of the population subject to focused enforcement a chance to come forward
and declare noncompliance. While the possibility of reduced penalties
exists, the campaigns do not guarantee such an outcome, and ultimate
penalty application depends on the circumstances. HMRC uses the
information gathered from the campaigns to conduct focused investigations
and, in some cases, prosecutions. Many campaigns have been narrow,
focused on particular subsectors in particular locations. For instance, to name
just a few, campaigns have included: a taskforce focused on security guards,
bouncers, and their employees in London and the South East;78 a taskforce
focused on construction workers in London;79 a taskforce focused on hauliers
in the Midlands;8 0 a taskforce focused on the holiday industry in the Lake
71. See infra text accompanying notes 208-13.
72. THE EXAMINATION (AUDIT) PROCESS, supra note 42.
73. I thank Caroline Bradley for bringing this example to my attention.
74. HM Revenue and Customs et al., Reducing Tax Evasion and Avoidance,
last accessed Oct. 8, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/govemment/policies/reducing-tax-
evasion-and-avoidance/supporting-pages/hmrc-campaigns.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., HM Revenue and Customs, Health and Wellbeing Tax Plan at
3.12 Penalties, last accessed Oct. 7, 2013, http://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/health-and-wellbeing-tax-plan-your-guide-to-making-a-disclosure/heal
th-and-wellbeing-tax-plan-your-guide-to-making-a-disclosure (discussing potential
penalties in the context of Health and Wellbeing Tax Plan voluntary disclosure
program).
77. HM Revenue and Customes, et al., Reducing Tax Evasion and
Avoidance, supra note 74.
78. HM Revenue and Customs & David Gauke, Tax Crackdown for
Security Industry, last accessed Sept. 19, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/tax-crackdown-for-security-industry.
79. Id.
80. HM Revenue and Customs & David Gauke, Crackdown on Hauliers in
the Midlands, last accessed July 10, 2013, https://www.gov.uk.govemment/news/
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District, North Wales, Devon and Cornwall;8 1 a taskforce focused on
restaurants in Yorkshire and Humber;82 and a taskforce focused on the
fishing industry in Scotland. HMRC has indicated that "[t]askforces are
specialist teams that undertake intensive bursts of activity in specific high-
risk trade sectors and locations in the UK."84
Government officials in the UK have actively publicized the
campaigns and emphasized their importance for a fair tax system. For
instance, David Gauke, Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury indicated, "[w]e
are determined to support hardworking people who want to get on, but the
people being targeted by these taskforces have no intention of playing by the
rules . . . . [W]e will not tolerate tax evasion and we have provided HMRC
with the resources to crack down on those who break the rules."85 HMRC's
Jennie Granger, Director General of Enforcement and Compliance, has said,
"[i]f you have declared all your income, you have nothing to worry about.
But, if you haven't, we will find you, investigate you and not only could you
face a heavy fine, but a criminal prosecution as well."8 6 Media and tax
preparer coverage of HMRC's use of such campaigns has been widespread.
In sum, the uses in practice of group and project-based approaches to
enforcement suggest that "worst-first" theories, particularly popular in the
scholarly tax literature, may be leaving something important out of the
analysis. While the mere existence of project-based approaches does not
prove they work, their existence should at the least trigger an examination of
why and when such approaches may increase compliance. Moreover, as
discussed previously, the combination of the hot spots policing research and
the Kansas City policing study suggests that the concentration, and not
merely the level, of enforcement can be essential. The relatively unexplored
question is: What circumstances might justify the use of enforcement







86. HMRC & Gauke, Crackdown on Hauliers, supra note 80.
87. E.g., ACCA, Another HMRC Campaign - Direct Selling, last accessed
Oct. 11, 2013, http://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/technical-activities/technical-
resources-search/2013/february/hmrc-direct-selling.html; BKL Tax, HMRC
Campaigns, last accessed Oct. 11, 2013, http://www.bkltax.co.uk/hmrc-campaigns
.htm; Kyle Caldwell, Pay Your Tax or Face the Consequences, Minister Tells Buy-





projects in the tax context? In the next Part, this Article examines this
question by setting forth a theory of concentrated enforcement.
IV. CONCENTRATED ENFORCEMENT
In this Part, a number of different disciplines are drawn from to set
forth concentrated enforcement, which can serve as a first cut for allocating
scarce enforcement resources across a large, highly noncompliant population
of taxpayers. This Article suggests that a base case for concentrated
enforcement may apply when enforcement is costly and limited and the level
of violations is high. This Article then suggests that the case for concentrated
enforcement can increase under a number of circumstances: when there are
feedback loops between noncompliance and enforcement, when norms or
other non-economic mechanisms can increase compliance but themselves
depend on rates of compliance, and when regulated parties exhibit
uncertainty aversion or the availability bias. Finally, this Article argues that,
to the extent that particular nodes of noncompliance can be identified,
concentrated enforcement works best by focusing resources on such nodes.
A. Description of Concentrated Enforcement
As used in this Article, concentrated enforcement means breaking
apart a large, low-compliance population into smaller subsectors and
applying substantially88 intensified application of enforcement resources to at
least one subsector. The subsector subject to the substantially intensified
application of enforcement resources can be said to be subject to an
"enforcement project." Implicit in concentrated enforcement theory is the
assumption that total enforcement resources are limited. As a result, the
application of substantially intensified enforcement resources (i.e., an
enforcement project) in one subsector must be offset by reduced enforcement
resources in another. The enforcement projects are applied on a rotating basis
throughout the population, with enforcement project applications announced,
but enforcement project withdrawals unannounced. 89 To the extent that
particular nodes of noncompliance can be identified, such nodes receive
particular enforcement attention.
88. Of course, "substantially" is a vague term that does not indicate
precisely how great the increase of enforcement resources is. At this point, the use of
the term "substantially" is meant to distinguish enforcement projects from small
increases in enforcement resources, which are not part of a plan to shock compliance
by reallocating resources. See Sherman, Police Crackdowns, supra note 70, at 8
(distinguishing reallocations "focused on specific target problems . . . outside the
usual formula" from "normal police personnel allocation decisions").
89. For discussion of announcement of enforcement projects and quiet
withdrawals, see infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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By way of example, imagine that there are 100,000 cash business
taxpayers and there are 30 tax auditors.90 Assume that, in any given year, one
tax auditor can audit 100 cash business taxpayers. If the enforcement
resources (the 30 tax auditors) were spread evenly across all cash business
taxpayers, then each cash business taxpayer would have a three percent
chance of being audited a year. Under concentrated enforcement, the 100,000
cash business taxpayers would be split into different groups, with at least one
group receiving substantially intensified enforcement resources. This group
would be subject to the "enforcement project." The remaining taxpayers
would face a correspondingly lower percentage chance of being audited in
that year. Imagine, for example, that 10,000 of the cash business taxpayers,
who sell dry cleaning services, make up a dry cleaning subsector of cash
business taxpayers. Under concentrated enforcement, the dry cleaning
subsector may be subject to an enforcement project. Instead of three auditors
being allocated to the dry cleaning subsector in a given year (as would occur
if enforcement resources were spread evenly among all cash business
taxpayers), perhaps 12 auditors are allocated to the dry cleaning subsector.
This allocation means that the taxpayers in the dry cleaning subsector now
face a 12 percent chance of being audited. The cash business taxpayers
outside the dry cleaning subsector face a concomitantly lower percentage
chance of being audited. If the remaining auditor resources are spread evenly
among these remaining taxpayers, then each cash business taxpayer outside
the dry cleaning subsector would face a two percent chance of being audited.
Concentrated enforcement involves announcement of particular
enforcement projects. The announcement occurs so that the members of any
given enforcement project know they are subject to the enforcement project
and can quickly change their behavior accordingly.9' Additionally,
90. The discussion of audit in this example is meant only to be illustrative
of how enforcement resources are allocated, not a suggestion that audit in particular
is how noncompliance by cash business taxpayers should be addressed. See infra
text accompanying notes 240-242 for further discussion of how the method of
enforcement (not the subject of this Article) is distinct from the allocation of
enforcement resources (which is the subject of this Article).
91. Henrik Lando & Steven Shavell, The Advantage of Focusing Law
Enforcement Effort, 24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 209, 215 (2004) [hereinafter Lando &
Shavell, The Advantage]; Edward P. Lazear, Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to
the Test, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1029, 1030 (2006) [hereinafter Lazear, Speeding];
McCubbin, Optimal Tax Enforcement, supra note 53, at 28 (suggesting that the IRS
"should perhaps consider making more (or more specific) announcements about its
audit plans"). Of course, even without announcement, the subjects of the
enforcement project may determine, over time, that they are subject to an
enforcement project. See KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS, supra note 63, at 51
(describing how a potential offender "gets the message" from experience). The
announcement nonetheless is an efficient way of providing members of the
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announcement serves as a means of assuring the subjects of the enforcement
projects of each others' likely compliance. For reasons fleshed out in more
detail below, coordinating their expectations about each others' likely
compliance can help trigger higher compliance.92 Taking the dry cleaning
example, prior to the start of tax reporting season, the IRS announces (on its
website and directly to affected taxpayers) that the dry cleaning subsector
will be subject to the enforcement project. The IRS may also alert tax
advisors who have historically served the affected taxpayers.
However, the IRS does not make any official announcement that it is
withdrawing, or concluding, an enforcement project. The quiet withdrawal
may allow the IRS to free ride for some time off of the perceived increased
enforcement, even after the enforcement project resources have been
withdrawn.93 While fully informed taxpayers may surmise that the
announced initiation of a new enforcement project means that the dry
cleaning enforcement project has subsided, taxpayers are not likely to be
fully informed. For instance, dry cleaners may not be searching the IRS
website to determine when the IRS initiates new enforcement projects.
Additionally, even if taxpayers knew when all enforcement projects were
starting, they likely would not have enough information about the IRS's total
enforcement budget (or perhaps even the calculation abilities) to be able to
determine that a given number of enforcement projects at a given time meant
that their enforcement project was over. 94 As a result, quiet withdrawals may
extend the compliance benefits of enforcement projects.95
enforcement project with this information, and thereby garnering their compliance
quickly.
92. A countervailing consideration is that announcement reduces
uncertainty and therefore the compliance that may flow from uncertainty aversion.
Notwithstanding this result, announcement is still important to communicate the
high likelihood of detection (and thereby the sufficient economic incentive to
comply) and to coordinate expectations of compliance among the subjects of the
enforcement project. Moreover, announcement may decrease, but should not
eliminate uncertainty from concentrated enforcement. See infra text accompanying
note 140.
93. See Sherman, Police Crackdowns, supra note 70, at 3 (suggesting
potential 'free bonus' residue of deterrence" from enforcement crackdowns but
pointing out empirical ambiguity).
94. See Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, supra note 46, at 844-46
(providing some evidence of taxpayers overestimating likelihood of audit and
discussing explanations).
95. But see James Alm & Michael McKee, Audit Certainty, Audit
Productivity, and Taxpayer Compliance, 59 NAT'L TAx J. 801 (2006) [hereinafter
Alm & McKee, Audit Certainty]. This experiment found that informing some
individuals that they would be audited increased their compliance, but informing
others that they would not be audited reduced the latter group's compliance,
resulting in a net reduction in compliance. However, in contrast, concentrated
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B. Economic Base Case
Why and when might concentrated enforcement increase
compliance? As an initial matter, a base case for concentrated enforcement
can exist when uniform enforcement would result in inadequate compliance
incentives across the population. 96 In such circumstances, compliance may
increase by concentrating resources in a subset of the population, even if this
leaves part of the population with very low incentives to comply.9 7
For example, imagine that 10,000 manufacturing businesses exist in
a given city. Assume that every business in the city will violate local rules
regarding disposal of contaminants, as long as the expected benefit
(measured by the probability of not getting caught, multiplied by the
monetary gains from violating) from doing so exceeds the expected cost
(measured by the probability of being caught, multiplied by the penalty the
individual has to pay if caught).9 8 The benefit from violating the rules is
enforcement would not provide direct information to individuals that they would not
be subject to an enforcement project. Additionally, even those not subject to an
enforcement project would face some chance of enforcement. Finally, the
experiment did not explore the potential gains from concentrated enforcement (as
opposed to an individual approach) or flesh out the potential implications of existing
levels of enforcement being insufficient. For further discussion of this experiment,
see infra note 112.
96. It is not necessary for the yield (i.e. tax dollars) from audit to be high.
Concentrated enforcement allocates scarce enforcement resources within a given
sector and does not change the total amount of enforcement resources applied to the
sector.
97. Jan Eeckhout et al., A Theory of Optimal Random Enforcement
Projects, 100 AMER. ECON. REv. 1104, 1104 (2010) [hereinafter Eeckhout et al., A
Theory of Optimal Random Enforcement]; Mark A.R. Kleiman & J.P. Caulkins,
Heroin Policy for the Next Decade, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., at 163,
167 (1992) ("And as the market grows, the ratio of enforcement to market size
decreases, so enforcement-imposed costs shrink, making the market all the more
appealing."); Mark A.R. Kleiman & Kerry D. Smith, State and Local Drug
Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy, 13 CRIME & JUST. 69, 88 (1990); Lando &
Shavell, The Advantage, supra note 91; Lazear, Speeding, supra note 91. For less
formal support for this theory, see, for example, KENNEDY, DON'T SHOOT, supra
note 70, at 95 (discussing the utility of picking off "a bite-size piece, something you
can handle"). But see Alm & McKee, Audit Certainty, supra note 95, at 814
(concluding that, under certain parameters, pre-announcing the subjects of audit is
bound to result in a "fall in overall compliance").
98. Of course, some regulated parties will take into account more than just
expected monetary benefits and costs in determining whether to comply.
Nonetheless, an economic case for concentration applies, even when the parties in
the population have different inclinations toward compliance. See Eeckhout et al., A
Theory of Optimal Random Enforcement, supra note 97, at 1105 (setting forth an
example in which half of the population will never violate a law and half of the
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$1,250. The city has $100,000 to spend on catching violators. It costs the city
$50 to catch a violator. Based on these constraints, the police force has
enough resources to be able to catch 2,000 violators.99 Any given business's
probability of being caught violating is therefore 20 percent.100 If a violator is
caught, the violator will have to pay back the $1,250 benefit, plus a fine of
$250.10' Each business's expected benefit from violating is $1,000,102 and
each business's expected cost from violating is $50 (relative, in each case, to
the amount that the business would have paid without violating).'0 3 The
expected cost from violating is less than the expected benefit. As a result,
assuming that the businesses take into account solely expected monetary
benefits and costs,104 every business will violate. Given the benefits and costs
of violating, a prospective violator must have a greater than 83.3 percent
chance of being caught in order to choose not to violate. 05 When the city's
resources are spread across the entire population uniformly, the city cannot
create an 83.3 percent chance of being caught.
This problem can be solved by concentrating the city's resources on
a smaller subset of the population, so that at least that subset has sufficient
disincentives to violate. For example, the city could announce that it is going
to use all of its resources on 2,399 businesses in the population.' 0 6 The
businesses that the city concentrates all its resources on can be called the
"enforcement project." If the city uses all of its $100,000 of resources on this
enforcement project, then each business in the enforcement project will have
a just greater than 83.3 percent chance of getting caught. As a result, none of
the 2,399 businesses in the enforcement project will violate! Of course,
assuming that they are solely motivated by the expected benefits and costs of
violating, the remaining businesses in the population will violate. Since they
face no chance of being caught, they have no expected monetary cost from
population will violate a law unless certain to be caught). Additionally, the regulated
parties clearly may face variable, rather than the same, expected monetary benefits
and costs from violating the rules. This example is meant to illustrate the basic
economic base case for concentration. Discussion in the text will generalize the
point.
99. $100,000 / $50 = 2,000.
100. 2,000 / 10,000 = 20 percent.
101. This fine is not meant to capture the social cost from violating. Rather,
by assumption, the fine is limited to a suboptimal amount.
102. 80 percent x $1,250 = $1,000.
103. 20 percent x $250= $50.
104. This assumption will be complicated further in other parts of this
Article.
105. To reach this conclusion, solve for P in the equation: ($1,250 x (1-P))
< (P x $250).




violating. However, by assumption, they were already violating because,
without the concentration of the city's resources, no business in the
population had sufficient disincentive to violate. As a result, even though the
concentration of resources on the enforcement project gives the businesses
outside the enforcement project free license to violate, the concentration
nonetheless caused 2,399 fewer businesses to violate.'0 o
107. Readers might notice that translating this example into the tax context
presents some issues. If the example in the text were applied in the tax context, the
concentrated enforcement would maximize compliance (by causing 2,399 fewer
businesses to violate). However, strictly speaking, the concentration would actually
produce slightly less revenue. Without concentration, all businesses would violate.
However, 2,000 businesses would still get caught violating, and such businesses
would have to pay back the $1,250 tax liability avoided plus the $250 fine. The no
concentration scenario would thereby produce revenue of $3.00 million for the
government (2,000 x $1,500). When enforcement resources are concentrated, all the
businesses in the enforcement project comply, which means they pay their tax
liability and no fine. As a result, their compliance produces revenue of $2,998,750
(2,399 x $1,250).
However, there are a number of reasons to believe that this complication
does not actually undermine the economic base case for concentrated enforcement in
the tax context. First, the IRS and Treasury Department have made clear on
numerous occasions that the tax penalties should be used as a means of ensuring
compliance and that penalties should not be viewed as a direct means of raising
revenue. See, e.g., COMMISSIONER'S EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE ON CIVIL PENALTIES,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES 1 (FEBRUARY 21,
1989), 89 TNT 45-36, Doc 89-1586; OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, REPORT TO CONG. ON PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 36, 1999, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/intpenal.pdf [hereinafter PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS].
For instance, the Treasury Department indicated in a report to Congress that:
In general . . . penalties should not be created or designed for
revenue raising purposes. Penalties may raise revenue collaterally
but this should not be a deliberate objective of penalty design and
doing so can create perverse incentives. Rather, the penalty regime
should raise revenue by encouraging taxpayers to remit the
appropriate amount of tax in the proper fashion. Thus, although it
is appropriate to consider the cost to the government associated
with noncompliance in designing penalties, fostering compliance
and deterring noncompliance should be the overriding goals.
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS, supra, at 36.
Translating this philosophy into the example in the text, the $250 penalty
should not be taken into account in determining how much revenue the government
receives in each scenario. Absent the concentrated enforcement, then, the
government would collect $2,500,000 (2,000 x $1,250) of revenue. With
concentrated enforcement, the government would collect $2,998,750 (2,399 x
$1,250) of revenue. As a result, by not taking into account penalties in calculating
revenue raised, the concentrated enforcement would raise more revenue.
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Abstracting a bit from this clearly simplified example (in which all
potential violators faced the same expected costs and benefits of violating
and therefore the same on-off switch), the lesson is that when enforcement
resources are inadequate to yield a substantial level of compliance across the
population, concentrated enforcement can increase overall compliance.
Steven Shavell and Henrik Lando have recently offered a more generalized
economic model to explain this phenomenon. Based on the notion that there
is an optimal social return per policeperson, they showed that when the
optimal level of policing resources exceeds the resources that are available,
the policing resources should be concentrated so that the largest possible
group of regulated parties in the population face the optimal level of
enforcement, leaving no enforcement in the rest of the population.10 8
This approach is consistent with the IRS's and Treasury Department's
stated goal of using penalties to maximize compliance, not as an independent means
of revenue collection.
Moreover, even putting aside the choice to disregard penalties as a source
of revenue, the extent to which voluntary compliance dwarfs direct revenue raised
from audit in the real tax compliance world, sources cited supra notes 51-52,
suggests that the oversimplified example in the text leaves something important out
of the analysis. Namely, the oversimplified example in the text assumes that an
extremely high rate of detection (83.3 percent) is needed to ensure compliance in the
enforcement project. The extent by which voluntary compliance dwarfs direct
revenue raised from audit in the real tax compliance world suggests that taxpayers
comply in response to a much lower rate of detection. As a result, in the real world,
the enforcement project very likely could be significantly bigger than that in the
example. By focusing on a larger group, concentration could thereby yield
substantially more revenue. This is all to say that while the example, on its own
terms, suggests that concentration may maximize voluntary compliance but not
revenue, in the real world it remains fair to assume that maximizing voluntary
compliance of taxpayers will also maximize revenue.
A countervailing consideration is that the IRS is often judged based on its
direct enforcement yield per cost ratios. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-13-151, TAX GAP: IRS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE REVENUES
BY BETTER TARGETING ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES (2012) [hereinafter TAX GAP].
As a result, the IRS might be criticized if it were actually to put in place a method of
enforcement that reduced direct revenue from enforcement to zero (as a result of 100
percent voluntary compliance). This practical consideration makes it reasonable to
assume that the IRS cares about both voluntary compliance and direct revenue. This
Article does not seek to resolve the tension between direct revenue and voluntary
compliance in terms of the IRS's mission. Rather, the Article focuses on the benefits
of concentrated enforcement, primarily in terms of voluntary compliance. As will be
discussed later in the text, by focusing on low compliance nodes (to the extent they
can be identified), concentrated enforcement may also take into account direct
revenue.
108. Lando & Shavell, The Advantage, supra note 91, at 214 ("[S]o long
asp* is positive, it is always desirable to focus enforcement effort in one region of
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Spreading enforcement resources across the population in such situations
would not maximize the return per policeperson.' 09
Moving away from a binary violate or comply choice, one could also
model a situation in which individuals in a given population can exhibit
varying levels of compliance (i.e., they can report a range of the tax liability
they owe). If there is a nonlinear response with multiple equilibria, then,
under cetain circumstances, concentating enforcement resources may
increase overall compliance." 0 For instance, imagine that when enforcement
is low, individuals exhibit low compliance, but when enforcement reaches
some level, individuals exhibit high compliance."'1 Prior to concentrated
enforcement, compliance across the population may be uniformly low. In
such a situation, the compliance gains from concentration on an enforcement
project in an announced fashion may be high (because they were previously
complying at low rates), and the losses from the individuals no longer subject
to enforcement may be low (because only their prior, low levels of
compliance could be lost). As a result, the compliance gains from the
enforcement project may outweigh the losses by the remainder of the
population. 1 2
Indeed, when the probability of getting caught is otherwise quite low
(for example, the general audit rate of one percent faced by individual
the city - and not to use any police elsewhere - when the available police resources
are such that P is less than or equal to the threshold p
109. Id.
110. On the other hand, overall compliance should not increase if there is a
linear response (i.e., if an increase in compliance in one group is offset exactly by a
decrease in compliance by the same amount in another group).
111. Various factors explored in other parts of this Article may help explain
why such a situation would exist. For instance, feedback loops between
noncompliance and enforcement norms may help explain such a phenomenon. It is
useful to illustrate how these explanations can be integrated into an economic model
or case for concentrated enforcement. For some evidence of potential equilibriums of
compliance within the cash business tax sector, in the form of nodes of low
compliance, see research cited infra note 224.
112. On the other hand, if rates of compliance are high across the
population, the compliance gains from the enforcement project could be relatively
low (because the enforcement project was already complying at a high rate), but the
losses from the individuals now no longer subject to enforcement could be high
(because the individuals no longer subject to enforcement were previously
complying at a high rate). See Alm & McKee, Audit Certainty, supra note 95, for a
model (and accompanying set of circumstances) in which concentration reduces net
compliance. Relevant factors would be the differing rates of compliance that would
be exhibited by the enforcement project versus the rest of the population and the
sizes of the two groups. The point here is not to suggest that concentration always




taxpayers)," 3 probability neglect may minimize compliance losses in the part
of the population outside of the enforcement project.l 14 Probability neglect is
characterized in part by a lack of responsiveness to variations in small
probabilities."'5  Many studies have shown evidence of relative
irresponsiveness to variations in probability when determining willingness to
pay to protect against low probability hazards.' 16 As a result, whereas the
enforcement project may be very responsive to an increase in the probability
of getting caught from a very low amount (say one percent) to a significantly
higher probability, the remainder of the population may have a lower,
relative responsiveness to a reduction in probability of getting caught from a
very low amount (say one percent) to a slightly lower, very low amount (say
0.9 percent)."' 7 This phenomenon would support the potential benefits of
concentrated enforcement. The bottom line is that a number of different
economic models (perhaps combined with probability neglect) can support
an economic base case for concentrated enforcement when compliance
incentives are inadequate if spread throughout the population.
113. IRS DATA BOOK 2012, supra note 29.
114. I thank Andres Sawicki for pointing out the potential role of
probability neglect.
115. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 71-74 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Probability Neglect].
116. E.g., Young Sook Eom, Pesticide Residue Risk and Food Safety
Valuation: A Random Utility Approach, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 760, 769 (1994)
(finding insignificant variation in willingness to pay for reductions of risk from
pesticides on food when variation in relative risk was substantial but total risk was
low); Howard Kunreuther et al., Making Low Probabilities Useful, 23 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 103 (2001) (finding relative insensitivity in willingness to pay
insurance premiums with respect to low risk hazards, at least when the risks were not
highly contextualized).
117. Cf Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 115, at 75 ("When a risk
probability is below a certain threshold, people treat the risk as essentially zero and
are willing to pay little or nothing for insurance in the event of loss. But when the
risk probability is above a certain level, people are willing to pay a significant
amount for insurance, indeed an amount that greatly exceeds the expected value of
the risk."); Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem,
111 COLUM. L. REv. 1385, 1401 (2011) (suggesting that probability neglect might
explain appeal of arguments to ignore one percent contributions to environmental
problems). It is worth stating explicitly that paying higher taxes in order to avoid the
potential consequences of an adverse tax audit can be seen as equivalent to
willingness to pay an insurance premium. This is not to say that the reduction in
probability of getting caught would have no effect on the remainder of the
population. Rather, the claim is that the tendency to ignore very low probabilities




C. Feedback Loops Between Noncompliance and Enforcement
Layered onto this base case for concentrated enforcement are a
number of circumstances that can strengthen the case for concentrated
enforcement. First, the case for concentrated enforcement grows when there
are feedback loops between noncompliance and enforcement. Feedback
loops between noncompliance and enforcement can exist when (1) increasing
the overall rate of compliance increases the expected monetary costs of any
individual instances of noncompliance, and (2) commonalities in
nonenforcement create significant returns from enforcement expertise.
As an initial matter, a feedback loop between noncompliance and
enforcement can exist when increasing the overall rate of compliance
increases the expected monetary costs of any individual noncompliance. This
dynamic can exist when enforcement is costly and limited and it is
insufficient to punish the existing noncompliers. As Mark Kleiman has
explained, when authorities lack sufficient resources to punish the existing
number of noncompliers, widespread noncompliance can "swamp"
enforcement resources, making it unlikely that any particular noncomplier
will be punished." 8 Conversely, if the overall rate of compliance is higher,
then any isolated noncomplier would face a higher risk of being punished,
and would consequently face a higher expected monetary cost of
noncompliance.119 In such a situation, to the extent that the overall
population is severable into subsectors, an enforcement project in a subsector
can raise the rates of compliance in such subsector. The increased
compliance in that subsector may then increase the expected costs of
engaging in the same amount of noncompliance in the subsector. The
enforcement project can thereby reduce the likelihood of noncompliance in
the subsector, even after that enforcement project concludes.120
118. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Enforcement Swamping: A Positive-Feedback
Mechanism in Rates ofIllicit Activity, in MATHEMATICAL & COMPUTER MODELLING,
65, 66-68 (1993) [hereinafter Kleiman, Enforcement Swamping]; Raaj K. Sah,
Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1272 (1991); Joel Schrag &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Crime, 17 INT'L REv. LAW &
ECON. 325, 326 (1997). For a (rare) discussion of this phenomenon in the tax
context, see Graetz et al., The Tax Compliance Game, supra note 39, at 25.
119. David A. Boyum et al., Drugs, Crime, and Public Policy, in CRIME
AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 60, at 393 ("The key observation is that being the
only dealer, or one of a few dealers, in a flagrant market is dangerous; the risk of
arrest for each remaining seller goes up as the number of other dealers goes down. If
it were possible to rapidly shift the expectations of dealers about one another's
behavior, it might be possible to make the market collapse quickly.").
120. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS, supra note 63, at 4, 54-55. Of
course, some violations will continue. As Kleiman describes: "[I]n a world of
uncertainty there will always be some violations and therefore some use of actual
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A feedback loop between noncompliance and enforcement also can
exist when commonalities in nonenforcement make enforcement expertise
valuable. Take, for instance, tax shelters, or abusive tax schemes that
produce tax benefits in ways that Congress did not intend. Tax shelters are
often (by design) quite difficult to detect, because they are reported in a
manner that makes them look much like run of the mill business schemes.121
Auditing a particular taxpayer in order to identify a tax shelter not only
produces tax liability from that audit, but also allows the IRS to identify the
tax shelter on others' returns and assess resulting tax liability. 2 2 For this
reason, concentrating enforcement enough to develop expertise about a
particular tax shelter can have significant returns to scale. In situations in
which compliance problems are common across a subpopulation,
concentration can allow the regulator to develop the expertise necessary to
produce the returns to scale from enforcement.
D. Norms
The second circumstance that can enhance the case for concentrated
enforcement is when norms or other non-economic compliance mechanisms
can increase compliance but themselves depend on a minimum, local rate of
compliance. 123 Scholars have discussed how relatively high compliance may
be necessary in order to create norms of compliance, which can then foster
future compliance.12 4 Relatedly, some scholars have suggested that norms
sanctions . . . . [T]here is some maximum number of offenders who can be
controlled by a given sanctions capacity. But that number is much larger than the
number that can be effectively controlled by the same capacity when sanctions are
handed out at random." Id. at 65.
121. See Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure, supra note 17, at 1635-37
(describing difficulty in detecting tax shelters).
122. Indeed, commentators have suggested that one reason to support a
regime in which taxpayers have to report certain suspected tax shelters is that the
information provides essential intelligence to the IRS, which can be used against
other taxpayers. See, e.g., Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure, supra note 17, at
1637 ("Without help from taxpayers and the individuals who advise them, the IRS
would face significant obstacles in detecting tax strategies like the contingent
liability transaction discussed above. Current law, consequently, imposes an
obligation on taxpayers and their advisors to raise red flags for the IRS when they
participate in transactions that bear tax shelter traits.").
123. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 101-
02 (1978) [hereinafter SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR];
MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 9, 12 (2000). Though Malcolm Gladwell
has popularized the notion of "tipping points," its intellectual roots are more readily
associated with Thomas Schelling (and others, such as Morton Grodzins).
124. See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation
Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REv. 675, 683 (2012) [hereinafter Morse,
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may be subject to tipping points, becoming much more widespread once
some threshold is reached.12 5 The problem is that reaching the threshold level
of compliance may not be possible with limited enforcement resources.
Importantly, the relevant rate of compliance for norm activation is often the
rate of compliance within small subsectors of an overall population. For
instance, as Thomas Schelling describes, whether one wears a turtleneck
likely depends on the proportion of the relevant population wearing a
turtleneck, with relevant often meaning local.12 6
When local rates of compliance are particularly influential for norm
formation, concentrated enforcement can segregate noncompliant
populations into local subsectors and apply rotating, enhanced enforcement
in the subsectors to help create and sustain compliance norms (and, as a
result of such norms, actual compliance) throughout the population.12 7
Initially, use of enhanced enforcement resources in a particular subsector can
raise the expected monetary costs of noncompliance within that subsector, to
generate a higher rate of compliance. Subsequently, this higher rate of
compliance may yield a norm of compliance in this subsector, which can
help sustain compliance going forward (even absent increased
enforcement). 2 8 Sequential enforcement projects throughout the population
may raise compliance substantially across the entire population.
Tax Compliance and Norm Formation] (explaining that "signaling has a virtuous-
circle quality: as more people signal compliance as a positive reputation signal, the
positive reputation signal grows in strength").
125. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643, 1674-75 (1996) [hereinafter Cooter, Decentralized Law]; Alex Geisinger &
Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory ofExpressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV.
77, 118 (2007) (describing a "norm cascade," whereby announcement of a norm can
yield compliance, which increases the power of the norm); Lederman, The Interplay,
supra note 24 at 1509-10. See infra text accompanying note 197 for Lederman's
treatment of this in the tax context.
126. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR, supra note 123, at
109. What "local" means, of course, depends on the context. Local may mean
individuals who live or work nearby, or individuals who work in a similar industry
or on a similar issue. In any event, whatever local means in a given case should
dictate how any authority, or police force, segregates the population for the purposes
of concentrated enforcement.
127. Id
128. See, e.g., Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 125, at 1675
(discussing situations in which state enforcement of a norm is necessary in order to
tip behavior into compliance with the norm); Lederman, The Interplay, supra note
24, at 1509-10 (discussing potential use of heavy enforcement in tax evasion context
to tip into a norm of compliance). The mechanism can also be a bit more
complicated. The existence of a norm may feed into expectations regarding the
likelihood of others complying, which may then inform individuals' beliefs about the
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The following example illustrates this possibility. Imagine that 100
employers exist throughout City B. Workplace safety laws apply to these
employers and City B needs to determine how best to use its resources so as
to encourage the employers to comply with the laws. The employers are
concentrated in five different areas of the city. For simplicity's sake, imagine
that the employers are divided equally between these areas, so that there are
20 employers in each area. It is costly to monitor an employer to prevent the
employer from violating workplace safety laws and this cost does not
decrease as the rate of employers complying increases. City B only has
enough resources to monitor (and therefore insure compliance of) ten
employers at any given time. However, for a variety of reasons, norms affect
compliance.12 9 In particular, each employer will comply with the law, as long
as the employer perceives that at least 50 percent of other employers comply
with the law.' 3 0 Employers tend to focus on the other employers in their
geographic area in making this norm determination. As a result, if City B
applies all of its enforcement resources to one of the five areas ("Area 1"), all
employers within Area 1 will comply. The reason is as follows: by
concentrating all of its enforcement resources on Area 1, City B can monitor
(and ensure compliance of) ten Area 1 employers. Since, at that point, 50
percent of Area 1 employers will be complying with the workplace safety
laws, then, by assumption, the remaining ten employers in Area 1 will also
comply with the laws. In other words, by breaking apart City B into smaller
subsectors, defined by area, and then using its enforcement resources in a
concentrated manner, City B can engender the level of compliance necessary
to obtain compliance by all Area I employers.' 3 ' If this compliance norm is
likelihood of being punished for not complying. As explained by Schelling (with
reference to tax evasion): "[I]f appropriate mutual expectations exist, people will
expect evasion to be on a scale small enough not to overwhelm the authorities and
may consequently pay up either out of a sense of reciprocated honesty or out of fear
of apprehension, thus together justifying their own expectations." THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 92 (1980) (emphasis added).
129. These reasons could include relationships with workers, relationships
with the public, or personal norms of a variety of sorts.
130. Of course, the idea that all employers have the same threshold for
compliance (or that they have the same benefits from noncompliance, for that
matter) is a simplification. The same analytical point applies even if the example
becomes more complicated. The math and exposition would become more
complicated as well.
131. This simplified example can be made much more complex in any
number of ways. For instance, it might be the case that 1,000 employers and ten
large Areas exist, and that City B can monitor only ten employers at one time. As a
result, City B would only be able to monitor ten percent of the employers in any
given Area. In such a case, under the parameters of this example, insufficient
resources would exist to tip into a norm of compliance. However, a number of
options might exist. The Areas might be divisible and, as a result, additional
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durable, 13 2 then City B can remove its enforcement resources from Area 1
and move on to Area 2 to obtain compliance, and on to Area 3, and so on.
The bottom line is that, when a norm that exhibits tipping properties exists,
concentrated enforcement offers the potential to obtain substantially higher
compliance across a population.
E. Uncertainty Aversion
The base case for concentrated enforcement also can be enhanced
when the regulated population exhibits uncertainty aversion, and
concentrated enforcement makes the population perceive greater
uncertainty.133 The foundation for this argument is the distinction between
risk and uncertainty. A risk can be defined as a gamble with known
probabilities.' 34 For instance, in the contaminant disposal example, above,
when enforcement resources were spread uniformly across the population,
concentrations of enforcement resources could create compliance norms in Subareas,
on a rotating basis. Alternatively, employers in a given Area may relay information
to each other about being monitored, which would enhance the effectiveness of
monitoring. Media attention (discussed in more detail below) to the monitoring
strategy may also make monitoring more effective. In any event, this Article does
not suggest that concentrated enforcement can always tip into norms of compliance.
When insufficient, total resources exist to tip into a norm of compliance for any
divisible subsector (or Subarea) and concentrated enforcement is not more effective
for any other reason, tipping into a compliance norm simply may not be possible.
However, concentrated enforcement underscores the potential benefits of
segregating a large population into small, divisible portions in order to tip into norms
of compliance. Moreover, while the IRS resources to audit cash business taxpayers
(examined below) may seem highly suboptimal, there is nonetheless a very large,
total pool that could be drawn upon in order to address small subsectors of the
population.
132. Cf Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky
Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 615-16 (2000) ("[W]hen an individual
perceives that the group of individuals engaging in a behavior is relatively small, she
is likely to cease engaging in the behavior; that reduces the size of the group, thereby
inducing even more individuals to refrain from the behavior, and so forth and so
on.").
133. Concentrated enforcement could also increase the perceived (though
not actual) risk of enforcement across the population. The actual risk of enforcement
would not increase because the total amount of enforcement resources would remain
the same. Only its allocation across the population would change. However, to the
extent that the strategy of using announced enforcement projects and quiet
withdrawals convinces more individuals that they are subject to enhanced
enforcement than they actually are at any given time, the total perceived risk of
enforcement would be higher. I thank Susie Morse for this point.
134. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 214-15 (1921);
Lawsky, Probably, supra note 18, at 1026.
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each violator faced a two percent chance, or risk, of getting caught.
However, not all gambles present known probabilities."' Many times, a
regulated party faces uncertainty, or a gamble in which the probabilities are
not known. The classic example of such a gamble is the chance of pulling a
red ball from an urn when the urn is filled with black and red balls, but in an
unknown ratio. 136 In the compliance context, a regulated party may know
there is some chance of getting caught for breaking the law, but not know the
percentage chance of getting caught. In such a situation, the regulated party
faces uncertainty regarding the likelihood of getting caught or, in other
words, the regulated party faces uncertainty regarding the compliance
gamble.
Uncertainty is important because research suggests that individuals
often exhibit an aversion to uncertainty itself. Daniel Ellsberg famously
posited the notion with the urn example, alluded to above. Imagine a gamble
in which an individual bets $100 and wins a prize if a red ball is drawn from
an urn. Imagine that the individual can make the bet either for an urn that is
filled with 50 red balls and 50 black balls, or for an urn that is filled with 100
red and black balls in unknown ratios. If the individual prefers the urn with
50 red balls and 50 black balls, then the individual is uncertainty averse,
because the individual has a disinclination toward gambles with unknown
probabilities. 3 7 Researchers in the compliance context have found evidence
that individuals frequently exhibit uncertainty aversion, which can increase
compliance. For instance, in an experiment regarding choices between two
payouts, one of which was higher but subject to a potential fine (which, if
applied, would make the payout lower than the "safe" choice), researchers
found that uncertainty regarding the probability of detection (or regarding the
size of the fine) decreased the likelihood of choosing the option subject to the
fine (the gamble).'3 8
135. Indeed, it would be possible to argue that few to no gambles in fact
present risk, rather than uncertainty. For example, when tossing a coin, a 50 percent
chance of getting heads only applies if the coin is not rigged. Nonetheless, some
circumstances (i.e., coin tosses) can be said (and, more importantly, are perceived) to
present risk, rather than uncertainty, whereas other can be said (and are perceived) to
present uncertainty. Lawsky, Probably, supra note 18, at 1026-27.
136. Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J.
ECON. 643, 650-51 (1961).
137. Id.
138. Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental
Approach, 89 IOWA L. REv. 443, 457-68 (2004); see also Thomas A. Loughran et
al., On Ambiguity in Perceptions ofRisk: Implications for Criminal Decision Making
and Deterrence, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 1029 (2011) (finding that, for no-one-around
crimes (hypothesized to be more likely motivated by factors such as likelihood of
detection), there was evidence of uncertainty aversion for low probabilities of
detection and uncertainty seeking for high probabilities of detection, but reaching
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Concentrated enforcement offers the possibility of leveraging
uncertainty aversion to increase compliance. It can do so by making the
enforcement parameters more uncertain. Consider a population of 1,000
largely noncompliant individuals and scarce enforcement resources. Imagine
that there are only sufficient enforcement resources to subject one percent of
the population to enforcement. Three possibilities exist for allocating the
scarce enforcement resources: random allocation across the population, a
"worst-first" method, or a concentrated enforcement approach (with
decisions about which particular individuals in a given subsector to examine
based on a "worst-first" method). The first possibility, random allocation of
the scarce enforcement resources, would result in a determinate risk of being
subject to enforcement of one percent. The second possibility, a "worst-first"
method, would create greater uncertainty. Some individuals would have a
higher risk of audit, and some individuals would have a lower risk of audit.
Whether the risk of audit was higher or lower would depend on the "worst-
first" method used as a trigger to flag individuals, and whether any given
individual exhibited that trigger. To the extent that either the triggers were
not public knowledge, or individuals could not be sure whether or not they
exhibited the triggers, they would face uncertainty regarding their chance of
being subject to enforcement.
Introducing concentrated enforcement would arguably enhance this
uncertainty. With concentrated enforcement, an individual's likelihood of
being subject to enforcement would depend not only on enforcement
triggers, but also on whether or not the individual's subsector was subject to
an enforcement project. Whether or not an individual's subsector was subject
to an enforcement project would be out of the individual's control. As a
result, even individuals who could minimize their audit triggers under a
"worst-first" method would still face an enhanced chance of audit under
concentrated enforcement. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the
application of enforcement projects could be layered onto uncertainty
flowing from continued, secondary use of the "worst-first" method to
allocate resources within an enforcement project. To the extent that the
different results for more emotive, face-to-face crimes). Recently, Gregory
DeAngelo and Gary Chamess found that uncertainty regarding the enforcement
regime significantly reduced speeding violations. Gregory DeAngelo and Gary
Charness, Deterrence, Expected Cost, Uncertainty and Voting: Experimental
Evidence, 44 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73 (2012). However, they created
"uncertainty" through compound lotteries, which they argued induced true
uncertainty as a result of bounded rationality. Id at 77-78. For an interesting
discussion of the relationship between cognitive biases and subjective probabilities,
see Charles Yablon, The Meaning ofProbability Judgment: An Essay on the Use and
Misuse ofBehavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 899 (2004).
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individuals in the population are uncertainty averse, concentrated
enforcement may increase compliance. 3 9
One counterargument is that announcement of the application of
particular enforcement projects would significantly cut down on the
uncertainty of the enforcement. While this is certainly the case, there is
reason to believe that the concentrated enforcement regime would
nonetheless introduce uncertainty, relative to the alternatives. As an initial
matter, while, as suggested previously, announcement of an enforcement
project's initiation in a particular subsector would be important in order to
garner a rapid compliance response to the enforcement project, the
conclusion of the enforcement project (the "withdrawal") would not be
announced. As a result, taxpayers would not have complete certainty that
they were done with an enforcement project at any given time. 40
Additionally, in compliance contexts, such as tax, in which compliance is not
a one-time event, but rather lack of compliance at one point in time (i.e., in
an earlier year) can be detected in a later period of time (i.e., audit of a later
year), the possibility of being subject to an enforcement project in the future
could give a potential noncomplier pause even if one is not subject to a
current enforcement project. As a result, while concentrated enforcement
does not present complete detection uncertainty and while announcement of
enforcement projects reduces uncertainty, it nonetheless offers a means of
injecting greater uncertainty into the compliance system.
F. Availability Bias
The base case for concentrated enforcement similarly may be
enhanced when the regulated parties exhibit the availability bias. The
availability bias, which is a cognitive bias, is a tendency for individuals to
rely more heavily on information that is more readily available, in order to
assess the probability, or frequency, of an event.141 A number of factors
influence whether information is readily available, including familiarity with
the information, as well as the salience, or prominence, of the information.14 2
For instance, as described by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, seeing a
car accident tends to increase the subjective probability of car accidents, and
139. Cf Sherman, Police Crackdowns, supra note 70, at 11-23 (discussing
uncertainty aversion and enforcement projects).
140. Cf id. (discussing quiet backoff strategy and some evidence of
residual deterrence after crackdowns, although cautioning that more empirical
evidence is needed).
141. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and
Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 190
(Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman eds., 1982).
142. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
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watching a house burn down likely increases the subjective probability of a
house burning, relative to reading about a house burning in the newspaper.143
Indeed, in the tax context, researchers have produced evidence of individuals
underreacting to taxes when taxes are not included in the stated sales price
and not otherwise publicized in a prominent way.
By operating through enforcement projects, concentrated
enforcement could produce more salient stories of enforcement, because a
subsector-wide enforcement project would often yield newsworthy stories of
enforcement. Indeed, news stories frequently focus on enforcement projects
in a variety of different contexts.14 5 As alluded to above, HMRC's use of
compliance projects has resulted in extensive coverage by media and tax
143. Id.
144. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation:
Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. EcON. REv. 1145 (2009); see also Amy Finkelstein,
EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009) (similar findings in
context of tolls). But see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax
Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAx L. REv. 19, 33 (2011)
(cautioning that the empirical evidence regarding salience at issue in these studies
(referred to by the authors as spotlighting) is in an early stage of development).
Somewhat relatedly, in the tax compliance context, researchers have produced some
evidence that stories of audit can serve as substitutes for statistical information
communicating a threat of audit. Alm et al., Getting the Word Out, supra note 51, at
401. However, in the absence of reliable statistical information regarding the
probability of audit, individuals might quite rationally try to derive the probability of
audit from stories of others being audited. Nonetheless, whether as a result of the
availability bias or as a result of some rational updating mechanism, evidence exists
of taxpayers increasing compliance in response to stories of audit (at least when
reliable audit statistics are not available).
145. For a very small handful of samples of such coverage over a short
period in April 2013, see Police to Crack Down on Underage Drinking, KEARNY
COURIER, Apr. 25, 2013, http://m.keameycourier.com/mobile/news/article_
dfl8242c-b2dc-5921-9bl8-a6d0el73f837.html; Police Crack Down on Distracted
Driving, W. VA. TRUCKING ASS'N (Apr. 9, 2013), www.wvtrucking.com/latest-
news/police-crack-down-on-distracted-driving.html; County Law Enforcement to
Crack Down on Speeders, TOMAH J., Apr. 8, 2013, http://lacrossetribune
.com/tomahjoumal/news/local/county-law-enforcement-to-crack-down-on-speeders/
article 450cdel6-a071-11e2-b740-00la4bcf887a.html; Mass., Local Police Vow
Crackdown on Welfare Fraud, Bos. HERALD, Apr. 11, 2013, bostonherald.com/
comments/1062646846; Scott Signs Internet Cafe Ban, Local Police Have
Strengthened Tools for Crackdown, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 10, 2013,
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2013/04/scott-signs-internet-cafe-ban-
clarifications-on-machines-now-in-effect.html; Michael N. Price, 10 Arrested in





preparers.14 6 To the extent that concentrated enforcement made enforcement
more newsworthy, it could increase the perceived costs of noncompliance,
without requiring additional enforcement.
G. Nodes of Noncompliance
Finally, to the extent that nodes of noncompliance can be identified,
concentrated enforcement would be most effective if enforcement
concentrated on such nodes in particular. This intuition was central to hot
spots policing, discussed in Part II and (at least according to HMRC's own
publicity) has motivated the choice of HMRC's particular campaigns. While
the general case for concentrated enforcement (as set forth above) does not
depend on the regulated parties exhibiting differing, observable levels of
compliance, if differing levels of compliance do exist, and they can be
detected, then project resources should be concentrated in problem areas.
Focusing on nodes of noncompliance can help ensure the greatest voluntary
compliance gains from concentrated enforcement, by increasing rates and
norms of compliance where such increases are most needed. At the same
time, focusing on nodes of noncompliance can help keep direct revenue from
audit as high as possible under a concentrated enforcement approach.
Additionally, focusing on nodes of noncompliance may help assure the
public that enforcement projects are being selected in a sensible and fair
fashion. Ideally, enforcement projects would be chosen through a highly
automated system designed to focus on nodes of noncompliance.' 4' The
result would be a concentrated enforcement system designed to maximize the
combination of voluntary compliance and direct revenue.
V. APPLICATION TO CASH BUSINESS TAx SECTOR
This Part applies concentrated enforcement to the cash business tax
sector and explores reasons why concentrated enforcement might help stem
evasion, as well as potential problems. The cash business tax sector is a
particularly apt setting for analysis of concentrated enforcement, because
neither classic deterrence theory nor "worst-first" methods (at least on their
own) offer much hope of stemming the tide of cash business tax evasion.
146. See sources cited supra note 87.
147. Some might question how well the regulator will be able to identify
nodes of noncompliance. Inaccurate information about nodes of noncompliance may
weaken concentrated enforcement, but not relative to the alternative, a pure "worst-




A. The Cash Business Tax Sector
"Cash business" is a common way of referring to small businesses,
which receive a large portion of their receipts in the form of cash. 14 8 Unlike
wage and salary income, which is subject to employer information reporting
and withholding, the cash revenue received by cash businesses generally is
neither reported nor withheld by a third party and is very difficult for
auditors to find.14 9 While, as a result of a new law, financial intermediaries
must report to the IRS various credit card payments made to small
businesses, these rules do not yield any reporting of cash receipts.so
Additionally, while cash payments greater than $600 made from a trade or
business to an unincorporated service provider are subject to information
reporting, these rules have limited reach and are often violated.15' For
example, service providers can incorporate in order to avoid the reach of the
reporting requirement. 152 Complying with the reporting requirements is also
arguably quite burdensome, and many service recipients simply do not
comply.' Crucially, cash payments for goods are not subject to information
reporting rules at all.154
The cash business tax sector is a striking example of how real-world
limitations on probability of detection and penalties can leave classic
deterrence theory with few useful prescriptions for addressing the most
148. See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion,
20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37, 37-38 (2009) [hereinafter Morse et al., Cash
Businesses] (describing small business tax evasion and attributing problem largely to
cash payments).
149. Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility ofIncome Tax Law Violations, in 2
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 76, 81-83 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989)
[hereinafter Kagan, Income Tax Violations] (discussing visibility of various sources
of income and concluding that visibility "appears to be an enormously important
factor - and perhaps the most important factor - in shaping compliance rates").
150. I.R.C. § 6050W; Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to
Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1733, 1757 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps].
151. See I.R.C. § 6041A.
152. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: A
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING
SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 17 (2007) [hereinafter STRATEGY FOR
REDUCING THE GAP].
153. Id. at 17 (discussing difficulties in filing information returns and
various exemptions, which reduce the compliance with the information reporting
requirements).
154. A recent attempt to require businesses to report cash payments for
goods in excess of $600 was quite unpopular, and it was quickly repealed.
Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy
Overpayments Act of 2011, H.R. 4, 112th Cong. (2011).
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pressing compliance problems. The significant limitations on information
reporting discussed above make detecting cash income underreporting quite
expensive, thereby limiting the likelihood of detection, the first arm of
classic deterrence theory.'5 5 Making the problem worse, the cash business tax
sector is quite large, relative to the available IRS enforcement resources. For
instance, the GAO reported in 2007 that the IRS's enforcement programs
annually contact less than five percent of estimated noncompliant sole
proprietors.' 56 A principal explanation for this statistic is that finding cash
business evasion requires intensive and expensive audits, which the limited
enforcement resources cannot yield in sufficient quantities.'57 Penalties, the
second arm of classic deterrence theory, do not nearly make up for this
deficiency in the probability of detection. While civil fraud penalties exist for
underpayments of tax due to fraud,'58 and criminal penalties for tax evasion
are possible,159 tax penalties are imposed surprisingly rarely.i1o Participants
in the cash business tax sector report a correspondingly low fear of
penalties. '6
The result of these practical constraints has been massive tax evasion
by cash business taxpayers. In 2006, individual business income tax liability
alone was underreported by $122 billion on top of additional payroll,
employment, and self-employment tax underreporting.162  The net
misreporting percentage for nonfarm proprietor income (here, referred to as
155. See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect
Theory Approach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 66 TAx L. REV.
111 (2013) (cataloguing the limitations of information reporting as a means of
increasing compliance by cash businesses).
156. STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP, supra note 152, at 3.
157. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-815, TAX GAP:
LIMITING SOLE PROPRIETOR Loss DEDUCTIONS COULD IMPROVE COMPLIANCE BUT
WOULD ALSO LIMIT SOME LEGITIMATE LOSSES (2009); see also Morse et al., Cash
Businesses, supra note 148, at 63-64 (2009) (describing limited audit threat for cash
business taxpayers).
158. I.R.C. § 6663.
159. I.R.C. § 7201.
160. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, REFERENCE No. 2010-30-059, ACCURACY-RELATED PENALTIES ARE
SELDOM CONSIDERED PROPERLY DURING CORRESPONDENCE AUDITS (2010),
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2010reports/201030059fr.pdf.
161. Morse et al., Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 64 (describing
limited audit threat for cash business taxpayers and relaying experience of cash
business tax return preparer who reported: "[I]n a typical year only a handful of his
300 or so clients were audited and while audits produced additional payments they
did not lead to civil penalties. He had never had a client threatened with criminal
penalties.").
162. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS TAX GAP MAP FOR TAx YEAR 2006
(2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/taxgapmap_2006.pdf.
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small business income) was 56 percent, as compared to a net misreporting
percentage of one percent for wage and salary income.'16  While the 56
percent net misreporting percentage of course implies a reporting percentage
of 44 percent, which is significantly better than nothing, the 44 percent
reporting percentage can be explained in large part by structural mechanisms
that help ensure reporting. Namely, this 44 percent reporting percentage
applies to all nonfarm proprietor income (or small business income), whether
the income is actually received in cash or not.16 4 As alluded to above, some
small business income is received in the form of credit card payments, which
are traceable and, more recently, actually reported to the IRS.16 5 As a result
of the perceived visibility of such payments, small business taxpayers
indicate that they report their credit card receipts.166 The 44 percent reporting
percentage, then, likely significantly overstates the rate of compliance with
respect to cash income, which is both the root and bulk of the cash business
tax compliance problem.167 As to the cash income, the existing enforcement
resources seem woefully inadequate to incentivize compliance.
B. Difficulties for "Worst-First" Approaches
The widespread evasion makes "worst-first" methods, at least by
themselves, ill-equipped to substantially increase cash business tax
compliance.' 6 8 "Worst-first" methods, such as the DIF score, work best when
most individuals are complying, thereby making it easy to spot a
noncomplier. 6 9 For instance, imagine that in a given sector, most taxpayers
reported honestly and reported their actual business deductions, which were
approximately equal to 30 percent of their gross income. In such a case, if
any one taxpayer reported a much higher percentage of business deductions,
the IRS could easily spot the taxpayer as suspicious. On the other hand,
163. OVERVIEW OF TAX GAP, supra note 26, at 1-2.
164. Id. at 3 (including all nonfarm proprietor income in the amounts
subject to little or no information category, which has a net misreporting percentage
of 56 percent).
165. See supra text accompanying note 150.
166. See, e.g., Morse et al., Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 50-51.
167. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 150, at 1757
(relying on similar research to conclude that cash is the "core of the noncompliance
problem for small businesses").
168. Cf IRS' RETURN SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 42, at 4 (suggesting
that cash businesses may be subject to non-DIF score analysis).
169. See Jeffrey A. Dubin & Louis L. Wilde, An Empirical Analysis of
Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance, 41 NAT'L TAX J. 61, 71 (1988)
(theorizing that "high level of noncompliance [in specific audit classes may make]
the DIF score a poor predictor of the expected return from an audit, at least relative
to other returns in a given audit class").
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higher levels of noncompliance mean that the IRS has a lower ability to spot
noncompliers. Using the same example, widespread noncompliance means
that the IRS has a much less reliable picture of what percentage of business
deductions is standard. As a result of having less reliable information, the
IRS is less able to identify anomalies and focus on them as likely
noncompliers.17 0
Complicating the situation, the root causes of the noncompliance can
also serve as means of coordinating on noncompliance. The lack of
information reporting and withholding in the cash business tax sector, which
make noncompliance so difficult to catch, also serve as a signal that
taxpayers have strong reasons not to comply. This signal may then mutually
assure taxpayers that other taxpayers are likely not to comply with their
taxpaying obligations, even absent any explicit conversations or
agreements.' 7 1 Coordinated noncompliance lowers the effectiveness of the
DIF score, making room for even more noncompliance. Structural
enforcement deficiencies can thereby create a noncompliance spiral.172
The importance of coordinating mechanisms comes into sharper
focus when contrasting the high level of compliance exhibited by taxpayers
who have income subject to third party reporting.173 Third party reporting is
not only important because it creates a high likelihood of getting caught, or
probability of detection, if a taxpayer fails to report the income but also
because the third party reporting serves as a coordinating mechanism,
informing taxpayers of the likelihood that other taxpayers with income
subject to third party reporting are likely to report their income.174 As a
result, the IRS is in a good position to pursue any given taxpayer who does
not report income subject to third party reporting. Imagine, instead, that
taxpayers with income subject to third party reporting generally did not
170. Lemos & Stein, Strategic Enforcement, supra note 38, at 26
(discussing difficulties with "worst-first" method" when "number of violators is
extraordinarily high").
171. Indeed, these structural features may be substitutes for actual
noncompliance communication.
172. Cf Kleiman, Enforcement Swamping, supra note 118, at 67
(describing downward compliance spiral).
173. OVERVIEW OF TAX GAP, supra note 26, at 3 (amounts subject to
substantial information reporting have an approximately 92 percent compliance
rate).
174. Cf Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 150, at 1738-
39 ("What likely makes information reporting so successful in spurring compliance
in the first instance is that, like "red light cameras" that snap pictures of vehicles
failing to stop for a red light, the taxpayer is aware that the government is
watching."). The argument being made in the text is a bit different. The argument in
the text deals with how information reporting provides information about the likely




report such income. Despite the third party reporting, the IRS likely would
not have the resources to examine and punish a large portion of the taxpayers
not reporting such income. 5 As a result, taxpayers would face a low
likelihood of being punished for not reporting income subject to third party
reporting, notwithstanding the high likelihood of detection.'76 The cash
business tax sector presents this coordinated noncompliance problem.
The heterogeneity of cash business taxpayers makes this problem
even worse. "Worst-first" methods work particularly well when differences
from an average reflect likely noncompliance.' 77 For instance, "worst-first"
methods can apply particularly well in the context of speeding, because it is
easy to identify who is the most noncompliant based on who is going the
fastest. But cash business taxpayers are in some ways the quintessential
examples of taxpayer heterogeneity. As a result, low reported income by
cash business taxpayers is not necessarily a reliable indicator of tax evasion.
For instance, a particular taxpayer who reports low income may just be a bad
businessperson and, as a result, actually experience business losses, even
though all other taxpayers in the subsector are experiencing gains.
Alternatively, a very profitable taxpayer in the subsector may be able to
report and pay more tax liability than all other taxpayers in the subsector and
still greatly underreport actual tax liability owed. This heterogeneity means
that the IRS cannot easily rely on straightforward comparisons between
taxpayers in order to determine who is likely to be the "worst." This inability
severely hampers the power of a "worst-first" method.17 8
C. The Case for Concentrated Enforcement
175. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 discussing enforcement
resources limitations of IRS. The fact that the tax liability would be clear would not
necessarily change this constraint. Cf David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Enlists Outside
Help in Collecting Delinquent Taxes, Despite the Higher Costs, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
20, 2006, at A12 (reporting that "[tjhe private debt collection program is expected to
bring in $1.4 billion over 10 years, with the collection agencies keeping about $330
million of that, or 22 to 24 cents on the dollar," whereas "[b]y hiring more revenue
officers, the I.R.S. could collect more than $9 billion each year and spend only $296
million -- or about three cents on the dollar").
176. See sources cited supra note 118.
177. Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 12-13 (1989) ("[T]he smaller the variation in the true amount on a
line item within homogeneous classes of taxpayers relative to the mean true amount
on the line item, the easier it will be for an auditor to establish a prima facie case of
noncompliance.").
178. Lazear, The Advantage, supra note 91, at 1054 ("[I1t is a general
principle in incentive theory that when noise is high relative to the signal, incentives
are diminished."); Lemos & Stein, Strategic Enforcement, supra note 38, at 26
("[W]here it is even more difficult to apply a relative performance measure than an
absolute one . .. a ["worst-first"] approach to enforcement will be inappropriate.").
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So, what conditions of the cash business tax sector, if any, suggest
that concentrated enforcement might help improve cash business tax
compliance? First, as described previously, a base case for concentrated
enforcement can apply when compliance incentives are insufficient if
enforcement resources are spread uniformly through the population.179 The
cash business sector is a good example of a situation in which enforcement
capacity is very limited and violations are very high. The low rate of
compliance reflects the very low expected monetary costs of noncompliance
that cash business taxpayers face if enforcement resources are allocated
across the entirety of the population. The very limited enforcement resources
available for the cash business tax sector and the high levels of violations
suggest that insufficient incentives for compliance may exist if enforcement
resources are spread throughout the population. These circumstances indicate
potential benefits from concentrated enforcement under the economic base
case for concentration.
Layered onto this base case for concentrated enforcement are other
aspects of the cash business tax sector, which may strengthen the case for
concentrated enforcement. The first feature of the cash business tax sector
that may bolster the case for concentrated enforcement is the fact that there
appear to be feedback loops between noncompliance and enforcement. As
discussed above, enforcement resources for the cash business tax sector have
historically been quite suboptimal. Moreover, as a result of the DIF score, the
IRS analyzes what the tax profiles of particular cash business taxpayers
should look like in order to identify taxpayers who have profiles that are
sufficiently outside of expectations. "0 Whether a cash business taxpayer is
likely to get audited, and the taxpayer's resulting, expected monetary costs of
noncompliance depend on a comparison between the taxpayer and other
relevant taxpayers. 81 The result is that, if the rate of compliance could be
179. See supra text accompanying notes 96-112.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
181. The DIF score is a particular manifestation of a more general
phenomenon: The more information the IRS has regarding what a taxpayer's tax
profile should look like, the easier it is for the IRS to detect noncompliance, the
higher the expected costs to taxpayers of noncompliance, and, therefore, the more
likely taxpayers are to comply. For general discussions of the importance of
information to rates of tax compliance, see, for example, Ilan Benshalom, Taxing
Cash, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 65, 78 (2012-13) [hereinafter Benshalom, Taxing Cash]
(discussing importance of information reporting); Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation
Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax 5
(Working Paper No 13-057), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20/Files/
pomeranz_no_taxationwithoutinformationc2fl8227-578f-4259-b75b-f62f2ell32
17.pdf (discussing, in the context of the value added tax, how "it is the interaction of
information with deterrence that leads to effective tax enforcement"); Slemrod,
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increased, the likelihood of getting punished for a particular instance of
noncompliance would increase.
Imagine, for instance, that a cash business taxpayer, A, is considering
underreporting tax liability by $5,000. Relative to paying the tax liability, the
expected benefit from underreporting this tax liability would be the tax
liability evaded, $5,000, multiplied by the probability of not getting caught.
The expected cost would be the penalty for evasion, multiplied by the
probability of detection. To the extent that all other cash business taxpayers
underreport the same amount, the likelihood of that particular cash business
taxpayer getting caught and punished is low, because this reporting would
not appear out of the ordinary. However, if all other cash business taxpayers
are underreporting only $2,000 of tax liability, A faces a higher likelihood of
getting caught and punished for underreporting $5,000, because A is now an
outlier, more likely to trigger review. As a result of this higher likelihood of
detection, A faces a higher expected cost from underreporting $5,000 and a
lower expected benefit. In other words, the higher overall rate of compliance
would increase the expected monetary costs and lower the expected
monetary benefits of A's own noncompliance, thereby increasing the
likelihood of A complying. Indeed, in a recent article, Fangfang Tan and
Andrew Yim offered evidence of this dynamic from a tax experiment they
conducted.182 In one treatment in the experiment, experimental taxpayers
were told that the tax agency would conduct a set amount of audits.' This
auditing rule made any given taxpayer's likelihood of audit depend on other
taxpayers' compliance.184 When more taxpayers had high incomes, reducing
their likelihood of reporting low tax liability, the incidence of noncompliance
(through taxpayers with high income reporting low) decreased
significantly.'8 5
Importantly for concentrated enforcement, the compliance of other
cash business taxpayers in a cash business taxpayer's own subsector is likely
to be particularly determinative of a taxpayer's own expected monetary costs
of noncompliance.186 For instance, in judging the tax report of a dry cleaner
in Manhattan, the tax profiles of other dry cleaners in Manhattan are likely to
Cheating Ourselves, supra note 24, at 37 (discussing how information reporting
relates to compliance).
182. Fangfang Tan & Andrew Yim, Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter
Tax Evasion? An Experiment on Auditing Rules, 40 J. ECON. PSYCH. 161 (2013).
183. Id. at 165.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 168-69.
186. This is consistent with (early) findings that audits of taxpayers tend to
have the highest voluntary compliance impact on taxpayers within the same class.
Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax
Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the US. Individual Income Tax, 38
NAT'L TAX J. 1, 8 (1985).
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be more indicative of what the dry cleaner at issue should look like, rather
than dry cleaners in Brooklyn, dry cleaners in Miami, or food vendors in
Manhattan, Brooklyn, or beyond.'87 As a result, an enforcement project on
Manhattan dry cleaners may substantially raise the expected monetary costs
of noncompliance, and therefore the compliance, of Manhattan dry
cleaners.188 This raised rate of compliance may help sustain compliance to
some extent even after the enforcement project moves on.
Relatedly, focusing on an enforcement project may provide the IRS
with a better picture of tax profiles in the enforcement project. This expertise
may increase the comparative analysis of the DIF score to better detect
noncompliance. This would provide a second feedback loop between
noncompliance and enforcement. Some evidence of cash business taxpayers
trying to benchmark their noncompliance suggests that concentrated
enforcement may allow the IRS to develop expertise regarding
noncompliance tactics used in particular cash business tax sectors, which
expertise may then produce high returns. For instance, in interviews, some
cash business tax return preparers reported stories of taxpayers backing into
what they reported earning, based on what they spent. 189 Similarly, cash
business tax return preparers were reported to plug in national averages to
calculate the deductions that taxpayers claimed and manipulate taxpayer
reporting based on industry averages and profit margins.' 90 To the extent that
there are commonalities in noncompliance in enforcement projects,
concentrated enforcement may provide the IRS with enough information to
identify such tactics and capitalize on this knowledge.
Norms potentially also offer additional, enhanced support for
concentrated enforcement. At a very broad level, cross-country attitudes
regarding the acceptability of tax evasion vary considerably, and these
differing attitudes toward evasion appear to be associated with actual levels
of evasion.191 However, simply appealing to norms of compliance has not
187. Cf Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of
Individual Returns, 65 REv. OF EcON. & STAT. 363, 366 (1983) [hereinafter
Clotfelter, Individual Returns Analysis] (suggesting that, although IRS audit formula
is secret, "[w]hat seems to be clear is that all taxpayers in a given audit class face the
same enforcement regime, in the form of the audit formula for that class").
188. But see Bloomquist, supra 40, at 44 (using results from modeling as
"indication that the level of tax reporting compliance by small business owners in
the real world does not necessarily result from taxpayers observing and mimicking
others' reporting behavior"). However, this result is, of course, dependent on the
auditing method (and whether it makes neighbors' reporting behavior relevant).
189. Morse et al, Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 53, 59, 61.
190. Id
191. Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves, supra note 24, at 40-41.
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been shown to have a significant impact on compliance.192 Rather, it seems
that compliance rates themselves may affect norms, which may then feed
back into compliance. For instance, Susan Morse, Stewart Karlinsky, and
Joseph Bankman reported on interviews with cash business taxpayers.19 3 In
these interviews, cash business taxpayers reported learning norms and means
of noncompliance from family and friends in the sector, who passed on
"shared wisdom" such as never depositing cash and never taking cash in
front of employees.19 4 Based on this research, a follow-on paper suggested
that one plausible hypothesis is that high noncompliance in the cash business
sector affects norms, which help sustain and perhaps increase
noncompliance.195 Through survey evidence, Michael Wenzel concluded that
perceived norms had a causal effect on tax compliance and affected personal
tax ethics for individuals who strongly identified with the group.196
Indeed, a number of scholars have discussed how high levels of
enforcement may play an important role in activating norms in the tax
context. This insight was at the heart of Leandra Lederman's suggestion that
heavy enforcement focused on cash business taxpayers might help tip cash
businesses into a norm of compliance.197 Jon Davis, Gary Hecht, and Jon
Perkins had earlier explored how increased enforcement can yield social
norms of compliance, which can reduce evasion.19 8 The open question is how
192. See, e.g., Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax
Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT'L TAX
J. 125 (2001) (finding no evidence that appeals to conscience significantly affected
compliance in real world experiment in Minnesota); Benno Torgler, Moral Suasion:
An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from a Controlled Field Experiment in
Switzerland, 5 ECON. OF GOVERNANCE 235 (2004) (similar finding in Switzerland).
193. Morse et al., Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 65-66.
194. Id; see also Kagan, Income Tax Violations, supra note 149, at 90
(exploring how cash business taxpayers have often learned from relatives, other
business owners, or even accountants how best to evade both taxes and detection).
195. Morse et al., Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 41; cf Caroline
Adams & Paul Webley, Small Business Owners' Attitudes on VAT Compliance in
the UK, 22 J. ECON. PSYCH. 195, 205 (2001) [hereinafter Adams & Webley, VAT
Compliance in the UK] (reporting from interview results of small business
proprietors in the United Kingdom that a "norm exists of minimising [VAT tax
liability] by any means").
196. Michael Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalisation? Causal Relations
Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491, 504
(2005). Wenzel also found some evidence that norms served as rationalizations,
because taxpayers' own compliance also appeared to affect norms. Id.
197. Lederman, The Interplay, supra note 24, at 1503-13.
198. Jon S. Davis et al., Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax
Compliance Dynamics, 78 ACCT. REv. 39 (2003). A number of recent articles have
begun building on Davis et al. to better understand how multiple agents interact. See,
e.g., Bernard Fortin et al., Tax Evasion and Social Interactions, 91 J. PuB. ECON.
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to allocate scarce enforcement across a large population of highly
noncompliant and not easily distinguishable taxpayers, such as cash business
taxpayers, in order to raise compliance and activate norms.
Concentrated enforcement offers a potential answer to this question.
While (by assumption) heavy enforcement across the entire cash business tax
sector is not possible, given the limited resources available, concentrated
enforcement could enable rotating enforcement projects in local subsectors
of the cash business sector. If norms are at least in part local, subsector based
(such as the norms of dry cleaners in Manhattan, or even all cash business
taxpayers in New York City), then an enforcement project in a given
subsector may be enough to generate higher compliance and a higher norm
of compliance. This norm could then help sustain higher compliance after the
enforcement project moves onto the next cash business taxpayer subsector
(such as dry cleaners in the next borough, or all cash business taxpayers in
the next city, or the like). A variety of research indicates that individuals tend
to cooperate with, and enforce norms of cooperation toward, one's own local
group, even when group assignments are random,' 99 and that individuals are
often influenced by local group norms. 200 To the extent that local norm
2089 (2007) (This was an experiment regarding the effect of social interactions on
taxpaying. The experiment had mixed, and some counterintuitive, results including
some evidence of an anti-conformity effect. However, the experiment used different
audit rates for different participants in each group, and audit rates did not depend on
reporting behavior. The knowledge of different audit rates faced by other group
members may have affected the response to others' behavior. Additionally, the fact
that audit rates did not respond to behavior may have reduced concerns about the
potential for one's relative underreporting to increase the likelihood of getting
caught.); Korobow et al., An Agent-Based Model of Tax Compliance with Social
Networks, 60 NAT'L TAx J. 589 (2007) (finding, in part, that low levels of
enforcement, combined with high weights given to neighbors' payoffs, result in very
high levels of evasion); Georg Zaklan et al., Analysing Tax Evasion Dynamics Via
the Ising Model, 4 J. ECON. INTERACTION & COORDINATION 1 (2009) (modeling tax
evasion decisions in the presence of various levels of network effects). As
acknowledged by scholars in the field, this work is in its infancy. See, e.g., Korobow
et al., Tax Compliance with Social Network, supra note 148, at 609 (indicating as
much).
199. See, e.g., Lorenz Goette et al., The Impact of Group Membership on
Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real
Social Groups, 96 AM. EcoN. REv. 212, 216 (2006) (finding that individuals
cooperate with group members and enforce a norm of cooperation toward group
members, even when group assignments are random and short-term).
200. See, e.g., Michael Wenzel, The Multiplicity of Taxpayer Identities and
their Implications for Tax Ethics, 29 LAW AND POL'Y 31, 35 (2007) [hereinafter
Wenzel, Multiplicity of Taxpayer Identities] (discussing and citing accompanying
research); see also Susan C. Morse, Narrative and Tax Compliance 5 (UC Hastings
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 14), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
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groups are particularly powerful in the cash business tax sector,201
concentrated enforcement may provide a realistic means of norm activation.
Taxpayer uncertainty aversion and media attention to tax
enforcement projects provide the final, potential support for rotating,
subsector enforcement projects as a means of increasing tax compliance
across the cash business sector. As indicated in Part III, concentrated
enforcement may increase the perceived uncertainty of enforcement, thereby
cfm?abstractid=2191216 (discussing importance of small group norms to tax
compliance); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997) (finding through empirical study that D.C.
Circuit Court judges' own votes on cases were greatly influenced by the identity
(and party affiliation) of other judges on the panel, and that this influence was even
greater than the voting judge's own party affiliation). Other research suggests that
compliance may respond to more universal factors, such as perceptions of good
governance. See, e.g., Ronald G. Cummings et al., Tax Morale Affects Tax
Compliance: Evidence from Surveys and an Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447 (2009). This research does not necessarily contradict the
particular, or additional, importance of local groupings and local group norms. See
Wenzel, Multiplicity of Taxpayer Identities, supra, at 36 (discussing multiple,
possible levels of identification).
201. Some recent evidence suggests this might be the case. See 2
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS, FACTORS INFLUENCING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE BY SMALL
BUSINESSES: PRELIMINARY SURVEY RESULTS 19-20 (2012), http://www.
taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Research-Studies-Factors-Influen
cing-Voluntary-Compliance-by-Small-Businesses-Preliminary-Survey-Results.pdf,
[hereinafter FACTORS INFLUENCING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE] (reporting that small
businesses that were low-compliance (as determined (imperfectly) by the DIF score)
"were more likely to participate in local organizations" and "were more likely to
report that other members of local organizations view tax laws and the IRS
negatively"). While this report did not find differing perceptions of deterrence to be
a persuasive explanation for differing levels of compliance (and therefore counseled
that increasing deterrence may be counterproductive), it is perhaps more notable for
identifying low-compliance groups and observable characteristics of them, such as
higher involvement in local organizations and particular geographical
concentrations. Indeed, the report explained that it could not make strong
conclusions about the impact of deterrence on compliance, because some low-
compliance taxpayers may have been motivated by a desire not to implicate their
own noncompliance. Id. at 38. Additionally, low-compliance taxpayers had more
experience with IRS examination than high-compliance taxpayers, which may have
skewed the reported perceptions of deterrence. Id. at 26. Finally, low-compliance
taxpayers may have had stronger incentive to provide justifications (i.e., unfairness
of IRS) for their low compliance. Id. at 28. As a result, while this report does not
support application of enforcement projects, it does provide some evidence of the
importance of local groupings of taxpayers, and the potential benefits from
allocating resources (whether they are in the form of deterrence, outreach, or
something else) in accordance with local groupings.
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eliciting greater compliance to the extent that the regulated parties are
uncertainty averse. Evidence indeed exists that taxpayers may be averse to
uncertainty, particularly when the likelihood of getting detected is otherwise
low. Jeff Casey and John Scholz ran an experiment in which subjects had to
determine whether or not to take a questionable tax deduction. The subjects
received probability estimates that the IRS would spot check their returns
and disallow the deduction. These probability estimates were subject to
various levels of uncertainty as a result of disclaimers regarding the
reliability of the probability estimates. In situations in which the estimated
probability of detection was low, the subjects exhibited uncertainty aversion
(or a lower likelihood of taking the deduction as the level of uncertainty
increased).202 In other words, greater uncertainty about the likelihood of
detection increased the amount of taxes paid. This research was consistent
with an earlier simulation by Nehemia Friedland, in which uncertainty
regarding the probability of a tax audit increased the deterrent effect of low
rates of audit.203  Concentrated enforcement may leverage taxpayer
uncertainty aversion to yield higher compliance.
Additionally, media attention to tax enforcement projects may
activate taxpayers' availability bias. A subsector-wide enforcement project
will often produce more newsworthy stories of enforcement than a low, and
uniform, application of enforcement resources across the population. The
DIF score does have some of its own salient benefits. Indeed, news outlets
and tax advisors frequently highlight potential audit triggers.20 4 On the other
202. Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague Risk
Information on Taxpayer Decisions, 50 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 360, 369-75 (1991). On the other hand, Casey and Scholz
found that, when the stated probability of detection was high, the subjects exhibited
uncertainty seeking (or a higher likelihood of taking the deduction as the level of
uncertainty increased). Id Casey and Scholz's results also appear consistent with the
experimental result obtained by Michael W. Spicer and J. Everett Thomas, that
increasing the audit rate is not as strong of a deterrent when greater uncertainty
exists around the audit rate. Michael W. Spicer & J. Everett Thomas, Audit
Probabilities and the Tax Evasion Decision: An Experimental Approach, 2 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 241 (1982). James Alm, Betty Jackson, and Michael McKee also found
that uncertainty regarding the probability of detection generally increases
compliance, but also found that a link between tax payments and government
benefits leads to less compliance. James Alm et al., Institutional Uncertainty and
Taxpayer Compliance, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 1018, 1024-25 (1992).
203. Nehemia Friedland, A Note on Tax Evasion as a Function of the
Quality of Information About the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines:
Some Preliminary Research, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 54, 58 (1982).
204. See, e.g., Kay Bell, What Triggers an IRS Audit?, MSN MONEY, Apr.
8, 2013, http://money.msn.com/tax-tips/post.aspx?post=9563ea68-b39c-49b5-b2bd-
bd55d2a99clf [hereinafter Bell, IRS Audit Trigger]; Joy Taylor, 14 IRS Audit Red
Flags, KIPLINGER, last accessed Sept. 2014, http://www.kiplinger.com/article/
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hand, while news media tend to highlight the audit triggers, their doing so
also tends to either implicitly or explicitly convey the message that
"[s]imple, plain-vanilla returns are fairly safe." 2 05 As a result, publicity
regarding the DIF score alone may convince taxpayers that if they avoid
audit triggers, then they need not worry much about the possibility of audit.
Publicity regarding concentrated enforcement may enhance the perceived
likelihood of audit without similarly conveying a sense of safety.20 6 As
alluded to previously, the IRS has used some local compliance projects to
focus on taxpayers.2 0 7 Media attention has flagged and highlighted many
such projects, including employers classifying employees as independent
contractors,2 08 tax shelters,209 misuse of the IRA rules, 210 fraud and identity
theft,21" and offshore tax evasion, 2 12 to name a few examples. News outlets
also recently reported that the IRS sent letters to a group of 20,000 small
business owners questioning whether they had understated their cash
receipts. 213 Additionally, as suggested previously, HMRC's use of tax
taxes/TO54-COOO-S001-irs-audit-red-flags-the-dirty-dozen.html; The Top Ten Tax
Audit Triggers, H&R BLOCK, Mar. 8, 2013, http://blogs.hrblock.com/2013/03/08/
the-top-i 0-tax-audit-triggers/; Robert W. Wood, Shhh, Home Office and Other IRS
Audit Trigger Secrets, FORBES, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
robertwood/2013/01/25/shhh-home-office-and-other-irs-audit-trigger-secrets/.
205. Bell, IRS Audit Trigger, supra note 204.
206. Cf Morse et al., Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 64 (suggesting
more publicity of cash business taxpayer audits).
207. THE EXAMINATION (AUDIT) PROCESS, supra note 42. Limited
information exists about how and when the IRS uses such projects. For an older
explanation, see IRS' RETURN SELECTION PROCESS, supra note 42.
208. Angus Loten & Emily Maltby, Payroll Audits Put Small Employers on
Edge, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2013, at B6.
209. Andrew Zajac & Jesse Drucker, Ray Lane Rode Tech Boom Tax-
Shelter Wave Broken by IRS, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jun. 8, 2013, http://www.
businessweek.com/news/2013-06-07/ray-lane-rode-tech-boom-tax-shelter-wave-bro
ken-by-irs-enforcement project#p2.
210. Ashlea Ebeling, The New Threat to Your IRA: An IRS Crackdown,
FORBES, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0927/investing-
withdrawal-penalty-irs-new-threat-to-ira.html.
211. Phyllis Furman, Money Matters: The IRS Is on Strict Crackdown of
Taxpayers Who Attempt Fraud, Identity Theft, DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9, 2011,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/money-matters-irs-strict-enforcementpro
ject-taxpayers-attempt-fraud-identity-theft-article-1.111868.
212. UBS Tax Crackdown Widens, CNBC, Aug. 17, 2009,
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1217031897.
213. Bernie Becker, Small Business Panel Presses IRS Over Outreach,
HILL, Aug. 9, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/domestic-taxes/316301-
small-business-panel-presses-irs-over-outreach; Critics Question IRS Initiative




campaigns has garnered substantial media coverage of its enforcement
efforts.2 14 It is difficult to determine the extent to which the media has
covered the IRS's projects in the absence of information about how many
projects the IRS has engaged in and publicized versus how many projects the
IRS has engaged in and not publicized. 2 15 Nonetheless, evidence of the
media attention to perceived enforcement projects suggests concentrated
enforcement is likely to increase the saliency of IRS enforcement.2 16
One potential, perverse side effect of media attention to IRS
enforcement projects could be that taxpayers notice the enforcement projects,
but believe that, as long as they are not subject to an enforcement project at
any given time, they are less likely to be subject to enforcement. However,
when cash business taxpayers underreport their tax liability, they typically
are underreporting tax liability clearly owed in a manner that constitutes
intentional tax fraud. There is no statute of limitations on such fraud.2 17 If a
taxpayer engages in fraud and the IRS can prove the fraud, then a future
enforcement project could cover the tax fraud as well. As a result, the general
possibility of being subject to an enforcement project would be relevant for
cash business taxpayers and not just being subject to an enforcement project
at a particular time. By making the possibility of IRS enforcement more
salient, cash business taxpayer compliance may increase.
As a final matter, it is worth noting that, to the extent that nodes of
particularly high noncompliance can be identified within the cash business
tax sector, application of concentrated enforcement should focus on these
nodes. Even though a widespread norm of tax noncompliance appears to
exist across the cash business sector,2 18 some taxpayers in this sector profess
John D. McKinnon & Siobhan Hughes, Small Business in IRS Sights, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 2013, at Al.
214. See supra text accompanying note 87.
215. A useful study of the extent of media coverage of IRS enforcement
could examine the percentage of IRS press releases that receive media coverage.
216. Indeed, for this reason, the IRS intentionally attempts to obtain media
coverage of its enforcement efforts. Jeremiah Coder, Conversations: Eileen Mayer,
116 TAX NOTES 738, 740 (2007) (describing concerted efforts to get media coverage
of enforcement efforts). Cf Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, supra note
36, at 290 ("Cognitive psychology research suggests that individuals are much less
likely to be influenced by tax-enforcement statistics than by specific tax-enforcement
examples involving real people."); Dubin, Criminal Investigation, supra note 51, at
4, 21 (hypothesizing that the media plays "an important role in disseminating
information to the public").
217. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(l)-(2).
218. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation, supra note 124, at 679
(citing tax evasion as the "norm" in the cash business sector).
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(somewhat sheepishly) to report their tax liability honestly, 21 9 and
government statistics indicate that a small portion of cash business taxpayers
is responsible for the majority of the underreporting.220 Indeed, the GAO has
recently reported that 10 percent of sole proprietors221 are responsible for
more than 61 percent of all sole proprietor underreporting.222 Squaring the
above statistic with taxpayer indications that they hew to industry reporting
averages223 suggests that perhaps there are industries of cash business
taxpayers that are particularly noncompliant. Recent research has suggested
that there may be nodes of noncompliance based on geography and industry
group.224 For the reasons suggested previously, being able to focus
enforcement projects on noncompliant nodes may maximize the voluntary
compliance and direct revenue benefits of concentrated enforcement, while
also helping its perceived fairness.
To be sure, not all of the features of the cash tax business sector
discussed above suggest that enforcement projects be applied in the same
way. For instance, in order to make the DIF score's comparative analysis
stronger, enforcement projects should occur by DIF group. If the DIF score
looks at dry cleaners in Manhattan together, then the enforcement project
should focus on Manhattan dry cleaners. Doing so may (1) concentrate
enforcement resources enough to make them effective (the base case
economic argument for concentrated enforcement) and (2) increase
compliance among Manhattan dry cleaners (the relevant DIF group), which
may create a feedback loop between noncompliance and enforcement. On the
other hand, the relevant norm groups may not correspond exactly with the
relevant DIF group. In forming norms, taxpayers may pay attention to their
neighbors, who may or may not be in their DIF groups. For instance, a dry
cleaner in Greenwich Village may adopt a norm of compliance based on the
219. Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes From the Cash
Economy, 117 TAx NOTES 506, 508 (2007) [hereinafter Bankman, Eight Truths];
Morse et al., Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 52-53.
220. STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP, supra note 152, at 15 ("[T]he 11.2
million sole proprietors at and below the 90th percentile understated their taxes by a
cumulative $14.3 billion. The remaining 10 percent (1.25 million) above the 90th
percentile understated a cumulative $22.6 billion in taxes, accounting for 61 percent
of the total.").
221. The GAO defines sole proprietors as individuals who "own
unincorporated businesses by themselves." Id. at 4. While this is a slightly narrower
group than cash businesses (which are generally small businesses with large amounts
of cash receipts), there is substantial overlap between the two groups.
222. Id. at 15.
223. See, e.g., Morse et al, Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 53, 59, 61.
224. FACTORS INFLUENCING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE, supra note 201, at
10-11 (identifying geographic clusters of low-compliance communities, albeit by
using the DIF score as a means of determining low compliance), 23 (identifying low-
compliance industries through same methodology).
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behavior of all other cash businesses in Greenwich Village, rather than the
behavior of Manhattan dry cleaners. Various arguments could be made about
which type of enforcement project would be most salient. The Manhattan dry
cleaner enforcement project is likely to be more salient for some groups of
taxpayers (i.e., Brooklyn dry cleaners) and the Greenwich Village
enforcement project for others (i.e., East Village businesses).
However, the above discussion does not defeat the argument for
concentrated enforcement but rather clarifies when it is strongest.
Concentrated enforcement would work best when all of the theories that
support concentrated enforcement apply and when they all suggest the same
enforcement project groups. For instance, if all of the supports for
concentrated enforcement apply and Manhattan dry cleaners are not only the
relevant group for the DIF score, but also for norms, and if an enforcement
project on this group is likely to be quite salient, and Manhattan dry cleaners
are a particularly noncompliant node, then an enforcement project on
Manhattan dry cleaners is likely to be very powerful. However, even absent
perfect overlap, the group that is relevant for one purpose is likely to have at
least some relevance for others. For instance, even if Manhattan dry cleaners
look to taxpayers outside their DIF group for the purposes of group norms,
the taxpayers in their DIF group (i.e., potentially other Manhattan dry
cleaners) are likely to be influential from a norms perspective as well. As a
result, if Manhattan dry cleaners are the relevant group for DIF score
purposes, then an enforcement project on that group is likely to tap into some
form of group norms (as well as salience and uncertainty aversion), even if a
Manhattan dry cleaner enforcement project is not the optimal enforcement
project to affect group norms. In any event, while concentrated enforcement
would be stronger to the extent that all of the factors work together, an
enforcement project that meets the base case for concentrated enforcement
and activates some of the enhanced factors for microdeterence may produce
deterrence gains.
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that this Article does not
definitively establish that concentrated enforcement will raise compliance in
the cash business tax sector. Rather, it fleshes out why concentrated
enforcement may increase compliance. Indeed, application of concentrated
enforcement would be quite problematic if concentrated enforcement
drastically lowered compliance in subsectors not subject to enforcement
projects and such decreases were not offset by compliance gains from
subsectors subject to enforcement projects. However, the concern that
concentrated enforcement could lower overall compliance does not show that
the existing allocation of scarce enforcement resources across cash business
taxpayers (or any other sector of taxpayers) gets the allocation right. Rather,
the concern affirms the need to think deeply about the issues posed in this
Article and whether and when concentrated enforcement (or some alternative




Additionally, while any application of concentrated enforcement
should be subject to rigorous empirical evaluation to determine its effects (as
exemplified by the hot spots policing empirical research, which built upon
the theoretical case for hot spots policing), informed intuition can help
determine when it makes sense to try concentrated enforcement. Imagining
the two ends of an enforcement spectrum can help guide this process. On one
end of the spectrum, a uniform allocation of enforcement resources leaves
every taxpayer with just enough incentive to comply. As a result,
concentrated enforcement may lead to a plunge in compliance in all
subsectors not subject to enforcement projects (and a corresponding plunge
in expected monetary costs of noncompliance and norms of compliance),
which may not be outweighed by increases in compliance in subsectors
subject to enforcement projects. At the other end of the spectrum, the
enforcement resources are yielding little to no deterrence when applied in a
uniform fashion, suggesting large, potential benefits from concentration.
Concentrated enforcement may lead to large gains in the enforcement project
subsectors and few losses in the other subsectors. The more an enforcement
environment resembles the latter, rather than the former end of the spectrum,
the more sensible experimental application of concentrated enforcement
would be. Additionally, the greater the uncertainty aversion, availability bias,
and concentration in nodes of noncompliance, the better advised
experimental application of concentrated enforcement would be.
For the reasons outlined above, a number of aspects of the cash
business tax sector suggest that the cash business tax sector may be closer to
the latter, rather than the former, end of the spectrum. The compliance that
does exist in the cash business tax sector can be explained at least in large
part by the visibility of credit card receipts. As a result, reporting of credit
card receipts may persist even if a particular subsector is not subject to an
enforcement project. Indeed, dropping from a one percent chance of audit to
a slightly lower chance of audit, combined with probability neglect, may
provide a reasonably high incentive to continue to report credit card receipts
and some minimal amount of cash income, even for subsectors not subject to
enforcement projects. In other words, there may be little compliance to lose
in subsectors not subject to enforcement projects. On the other hand, the very
low reporting of cash receipts and the very limited enforcement resources
suggests that there may be much to gain from concentrated enforcement. A
variety of mechanisms, including the role of the DIF score in creating
feedback loops between noncompliance and enforcement and the potential
role of local norms in making compliance sticky suggest additional reasons
why the gains in subsectors subject to enforcement projects may more than
outweigh the losses elsewhere. Evidence of taxpayer uncertainty aversion,
media attention to tax crackdowns, and seeming nodes of noncompliance
enhance the case for concentrated enforcement in the cash business tax
2014] 379
Florida Tax Review
sector. Put simply, this Article suggests that the theoretical case for
concentrated enforcement in the cash business tax sector is strong enough to
merit empirical testing.
D. Objections and Responses
Aside from this inherent empirical question, a number of potential
objections to the application of concentrated enforcement to cash business
tax sector also may exist. As an initial matter, in discussing the potential
gains from concentrated enforcement, this Article has focused on gains from
concentrating audit resources on subsectors of cash business taxpayers. As a
result, the first potential objection to concentrated enforcement is that audits
of cash business taxpayers are problematic for a number of reasons: they do
not detect all evasion, they are expensive and low yield, and even heavy
concentrations of resources may not produce high rates of audits for the cash
business taxpayers in an enforcement project.
Indeed, the frequent lack of a paper trail associated with cash
business tax evasion, combined with these taxpayers' own evasion
sophistication does make cash business tax evasion very difficult for auditors
to find.2 25 As described by Joseph Bankman, evasion techniques include
"special cash registers, ringing up sales as estimates, the use of two sets of
books, [and] paying suppliers in cash to avoid paper trails." 2 26 Additionally,
cash business taxpayers frequently hoard cash business proceeds or reinvest
them in the business so as not to create a discrepancy between income and
spending.227 As a result, even after a comprehensive audit, the IRS may fail
to detect some (or much) cash business tax evasion.
In terms of expense and yield from audits, the GAO has observed
that audits of sole proprietors filing Schedule Cs with their tax returns (which
include cash business audits) are quite time consuming relative to other types
of audits.228 Since audits of sole proprietors are often field audits, rather than
correspondence audits, they also must be conducted by more experienced
225. Clotfelter, Individual Returns Analysis, supra note 187, at 366, 367;
Joel Slemrod, An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion, 67 REv. ECON. & STAT. 232, 233
(1985). For a general discussion of the difficulty of determining the amount of
noncompliance actually detected by auditors, see Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation, supra note 17, at 584 (discussing the problem and
concluding that the rate of detection on audit is probably below (and perhaps well
below) 50 percent).
226. Bankman, Eight Truths, supra note 219, at 508; see also Kagan,
Income Tax Violations, supra note 149, at 79-80 (making some similar observations
in description of informal suppliers).
227. Morse et al., Cash Businesses, supra note 148, at 51-54.
228. STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP, supra note 152, at 22.
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IRS officials, adding to the expense of the audits.2 29 Compounding these
difficulties, cash business tax audits produce relatively low tax revenue
yields from audits.230
Perhaps as a result of some of the above factors, heavy
concentrations of auditing resources may nonetheless leave even the cash
business taxpayers subject to enforcement projects with an unreasonably low
likelihood of being audited. Take, for instance, the cash business dry cleaner
considering evading tax liability by $5,000. Prior to concentrated
enforcement, the dry cleaner would face an approximately one percent
chance of being audited, 2 3 1 and evasion of tax liability would be subject to a
penalty of 75 percent of the amount of tax evaded.232 As a result, relative to
paying the tax liability, the dry cleaner would have an expected benefit from
evading of $4,950 ($5,000 taxes saved x 99 percent likelihood of not getting
caught) and an expected cost of $37.50 (fine of $3,750 x one percent chance
of getting caught). The result is that, under an expected benefits and costs
analysis, the dry cleaner should evade. Now imagine that, after application of
concentrated enforcement, the dry cleaner is subject to an enforcement
project. The enforcement project increases the dry cleaner's possibility of
being audited to ten times what it was previously, such that the dry cleaner
now has a ten percent chance of being audited. The dry cleaner nonetheless
still faces an unreasonably low chance of being audited. The expected cost of
evading would increase substantially, to $375 ($3,750 x ten percent chance
of being audited). However, the expected benefit from evading, now $4,500,
($5,000 taxes saved x 90 percent likelihood of not getting caught) is still
many times higher. As a result, an expected benefits and costs analysis
suggests that the dry cleaner should still evade. This result might suggest to
some that the application of concentrated enforcement is fruitless.2 3 3
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., The Changing Face of Tax
Enforcement, 1978-88, 43 TAx LAW. 893, 900-01 (1990).
231. See supra text accompanying note 29.
232. I.R.C. § 6663(a). As discussed previously, criminal sanctions are
possible but penalties in general, much less criminal penalties, are imposed
surprisingly rarely. See supra text accompanying note 160.
233. One response to this problem would be to engage in even more
concentration of resources to increase the likelihood of the enforcement project
group(s) being audited. While the overall level of enforcement resources, relative to
all cash business taxpayers, is quite low if all resources available were concentrated
on very few subsets of taxpayers at any given time, the likelihood of being audited
could. be quite (and prohibitively) high. Indeed, for reasons suggested in this Article,
such an approach should be strongly considered. For the sake of argument, though,
we can contemplate the situation set forth in the text where audit likelihood remains
too low even after concentration.
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A number of responses to this line of argument are in order. As an
initial matter, while it is true that audits in the cash business tax sector
present a number of problems to the extent that concentrated enforcement
can nonetheless improve the use of these audits, it is a worthwhile
innovation. As the GAO has indicated, the massive underreporting by cash
business taxpayers suggests that, notwithstanding the relatively low direct
yields from cash business taxpayer audits, these audits may play a crucial
2 34role in increasing tax revenues by increasing voluntary compliance. At a
broader level, failing to audit cash business taxpayers would sanction the
widespread evasion in the cash business tax sector. It would also compound
the inefficient flow of even more economic activity to the cash business tax
sector, in order to take advantage of the seemingly sanctioned, lower tax
liability. 2 35 Because Congress has not endorsed this outcome, and significant
fairness and efficiency reasons counsel against it, auditing cash business
taxpayers will remain part of the IRS's enforcement arsenal.2 36 With audits
of cash business taxpayers here to stay, the admitted, fundamental problems
with auditing these taxpayers are beside the point. If concentrated
enforcement can better allocate auditing resources, then it can help improve
tax compliance.
Along the same lines, the important question in evaluating
concentrated enforcement is not whether concentrated enforcement causes
every taxpayer to comply, but rather whether concentrated enforcement can
improve compliance, relative to alternative allocations of enforcement
resources. Take the dry cleaner example, discussed above. As explained, an
expected benefits and costs calculus may suggest that even after application
of concentrated enforcement, the dry cleaner may evade the $5,000 of tax
liability. However, there is more to the story. Tax scholars have suggested a
number of reasons why taxpayers do not engage in a simple comparison of
expected benefits and costs in making their compliance decisions. Perhaps
most notably, risk aversion causes taxpayers to overweigh the expected
234. TAX GAP, supra note 107 (cautioning against drastic decreases of
auditing in a particular sector because of unknown effects on voluntary compliance);
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP, supra note 152, at 22-23.
235. See Bankman, Eight Truths, supra note 219, at 507 (describing how
cash economy swells to reflect low effective tax rate).
236. This is not to say that auditing resources should not be lower in the
cash business tax sector than in other sectors to take into account the particular
costliness of cash business taxpayer audits and relatively low yields from such
audits. See, e.g., Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves, supra note 24, at 44 (suggesting that
evasion should be higher in the cash business tax sector to account of these features
of the sector). Indeed, nothing in this Article suggests that the allocation of
enforcement resources between different sectors of taxpayers should be changed.
Rather, the Article focuses on the allocation of enforcement resources within the
cash business taxpayer sector.
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costs. 2 37 Taxpayers may systematically overweigh the likelihood of audit.2 38
Taxpayers may also wish to avoid the cost of audit itself and fear criminal
penalties, even though the possibility of their application is remote.239
Additionally, as suggested previously, non-economic reasons, such as norms
and the like, may affect the calculation, causing taxpayers to comply even
when a standard economic formulation may suggest otherwise.
Finally, as indicated in this Article, the expected benefits and costs
calculation does not take into account the fact that, as compliance increases,
other mechanisms are likely to kick in to make noncompliance more costly:
norms of compliance are likely to become stronger, the likelihood of getting
caught for not complying within the particular subsector may increase, and
the perception of audit rate may seem even higher than it actually is because
of the salience of the enforcement project. Putting these factors together, the
expected monetary cost of evading probably significantly understates the
perceived cost to the dry cleaner of evading. As a result, if concentrated
enforcement can move the compliance calculus in the right direction, then it
may increase compliance.
Additionally, while this Article has often discussed concentrating
auditing resources, it has done so as an illustration of how concentrated
enforcement can concentrate enforcement resources, not as an endorsement
of audits in particular. Put another way, concentrated enforcement speaks
generally to the allocation of enforcement resources, not necessarily the
particular method of enforcement. 2 40 Tax scholars have suggested a number
of innovative means of detecting noncompliance in the cash business tax
sector other than relying exclusively on intensive audits. For instance, Joseph
Bankman has suggested potentially cross-checking tax returns and real
property or transfer tax records and rooting out influential tax preparers who
encourage extensive tax evasion. 24 1 Alternatively, concentrated enforcement
could be used to focus attention on tax return preparers aiding cash business
tax evasion. This Article stands for the proposition that, whatever form of
enforcement the IRS uses, allocation of enforcement resources is crucial, and
under certain circumstances, concentrated enforcement may improve this
allocation. Put another way, the allocation of enforcement resources at the
heart of this Article can extend beyond auditing cash business taxpayers and,
237. Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A
Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. EcoN. 323, 327-30 (1972).
238. Michele Bernasconi, Tax Evasion and Orders of Risk Aversion, 67 J.
PUB. ECON. 123, 131 (1998).
239. I thank Leandra Lederman for this point.
240. As a result, while alternative tax regimes such as a VAT are outside
the scope of this article, the allocation of scarce enforcement resources at the heart of
this Article could be applied to alternative regimes, including a VAT.
241. Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, the Cash Economy,
and Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2005).
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indeed, beyond the cash sector entirely to many other tax compliance
problems. 242
Similarly, a number of objections might apply to the application of
concentrated enforcement to cash business taxpayers in particular. For
instance, cash business taxpayers might not be particularly worried about
their compliance reputations and therefore might be less likely to respond to
new norms of compliance than more institutional actors. 2 43 Enforcement
projects focused on tax return preparers, to name just one example, might be
better able to tap into concern about relative reputation in order to increase
compliance. Enforcement action directed against tax return preparers may
also allow the IRS more leverage to publicize instances of noncompliance,
thereby offering the potential for greater signaling and reputational effects
flowing from increasing compliance spirals. However, these concerns about
application to cash business taxpayers in particular, while helpful in flagging
considerations that should be taken into account in choosing the best settings
for concentrated enforcement, do not undermine the concept of concentrated
enforcement altogether. Moreover, while groups other than cash business
taxpayers may be even better suited for concentrated enforcement, cash
business taxpayers do have to be subject to some amount of enforcement. To
the extent that concentrated enforcement improves cash business tax
enforcement, it should be applied. This Article should be understood as
making the case for experimental application of concentrated enforcement in
the particularly difficult cash business tax sector, not as making the case that
this setting is the optimal one for concentrated enforcement. Indeed, a
continuing, broader contemplation of when concentrated enforcement works
and why would be a positive development.
Another potential, even predictable, problem, with concentrated
enforcement is compliance decay. Imagine that the IRS engages in a wildly
successful enforcement project on dry cleaners in Manhattan. As a result, all
dry cleaners in Manhattan comply fully with their tax obligations. Norms of
tax compliance now pervade the subsector. Prices for dry cleaning in New
York City rise to reflect tax compliance. The IRS can more easily identify
noncompliers. However, after the enforcement project subsides, the
242. An analysis of how concentrated enforcement might extend to other
tax compliance contexts (and how, if at all, it might need to be reformed as applied
in other contexts) is beyond the scope of this Article. If concentrated enforcement
were applied in a situation in which noncompliance was more likely to reflect
sincere mistakes or confusion, then greater concern might exist about compliance
backlash, discussed in more detail infra text accompanying notes 255-256. In such
cases, the concentrated enforcement approach may benefit from being framed more
as a compliance, rather than a deterrence, initiative.
243. Cf Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation, supra note 124, at
694-95 (contrasting reputation sensitive and reputation insensitive tax evaders).
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incentives to evade tax liability will return predictably.2 44 Although honest
taxpayers can now compete in the market and still make a profit, this does
not reduce the incentive to evade. As time passes, improved comparative
analysis gained from the enforcement project may erode because changed
economic conditions and changes in the market will weaken the comparative
analysis. As more Manhattan dry cleaners make the decision to evade in
response to these conditions, compliance will decrease further, it will be
harder to compete as an honest taxpayer, and compliance will spiral
downward. In some ways, then, the likelihood of eventual decay may seem
to undermine the enforcement project.
However, as dismal as the eventual, even likely, decay may seem, it
does not necessarily undermine the case for concentrated enforcement.
Recall that the base case for concentrated enforcement is that, when
enforcement is limited and costly and violations are high, total compliance
may increase when enforcement resources are concentrated on a smaller
portion of the overall cash business taxpayer sector. This can be true even if
the concentration leaves the remainder of cash business taxpayers with very
low incentives to comply. In this regard, focusing on compliance decay is
somewhat beside the point. The most important question is whether
concentrated enforcement increases overall compliance. It may be able to do
so by increasing compliance in the subsectors actually subject to
enforcement projects at any given time, even if the other subsectors exhibit
drastically low rates of compliance. For instance, to take the extreme case,
even if Manhattan dry cleaners do not comply at all after the Manhattan dry
cleaner enforcement project ends, concentrated enforcement would still make
sense if the compliance in the subsectors subject to enforcement projects
made up for the dry cleaners' (and other non-enforcement project
subsectors') lack of compliance. Additionally, as suggested previously, there
are reasons to think that compliance might be sustainable, to some extent,
after an enforcement project subsides. Improved (if not perfect) comparative
analysis, norms, uncertainty aversion, and media attention to enforcement
projects all serve as independent, and yet, reinforcing reasons why some
amount of compliance in the dry cleaning subsector might remain after the
enforcement project. For instance, if norms of compliance are high enough to
keep compliance at a higher level in the dry cleaning subsector after the
enforcement project, then the higher compliance may interact with the other
mechanisms to help maintain compliance, which may keep norms higher. In
244. This result could be exaggerated by a "bomb crater" effect, whereby
being subject to an enforcement project (or being audited) makes taxpayers believe
that the likelihood of being subject to a subsequent enforcement project (or being
audited) is very low, making room for evasion. Boris Maciejovsky et al.,
Misperceptions of Chance and Loss Repair: On the Dynamics of Tax Compliance,
28 J. EcoN. PSYCH. 678 (2007).
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short, while compliance decay may occur, compliance decay alone would not
undermine concentrated enforcement, and concentrated enforcement may
actually help stem the decay.
Another potential problem is taxpayer entrenchment to tax evasion
positions. An underlying assumption of much of the discussion about
concentrated enforcement has been that taxpayers would respond to an
announced enforcement project by reporting more tax liability as a result of
the greater probability of detection. However, in response to an enforcement
project, cash business taxpayers may report lower tax liability to create
greater bargaining leverage with the IRS. Additionally, the multi-year nature
of audits may give taxpayers some incentive not to raise tax liability
reporting in response to an enforcement project because doing so may signal
to the IRS that the taxpayer was previously evading, thereby flagging the
taxpayer's prior years as ripe for IRS review.
While this entrenchment is certainly possible, some evidence
suggests that, at least across cash business taxpayers, the more likely
response to an enforcement project is higher reporting of tax liability. The
high correlation between information reporting and tax compliance, 2 45 and
the strong relationship between higher audit rates and higher voluntary
reporting of tax liability, 246 suggests that taxpayers heavily weigh the
likelihood of getting caught in their calculus of how much tax liability to
report. With respect to a higher chance of being audited, researchers ran an
experiment in Minnesota in which taxpayers received a letter indicating that
the tax returns they were going to file would be "closely examined." In
response to this letter, high-income taxpayers actually lowered their reported
tax liability, but medium and low income taxpayers raised their tax
liability. 24 7 While the researchers could not conclude with certainty what
explained this behavior, they hypothesized that the high-income taxpayers
(now freed of the belief that they should report a high enough tax liability to
evade audit altogether) may have lowered their reported tax liability to
increase their bargaining leverage with the IRS. 248 This is a tactic that makes
some sense when the tax law is uncertain, as is often the case for high-
income taxpayers engaged in complex tax planning, because uncertainty
breeds a fair amount of room for potential bargaining between taxpayers and
the IRS, and aggressive, low reporting has fewer downsides for taxpayers
245. See sources cited supra note 181.
246. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income, supra note 51, at 35
(finding that "audits have a strong, positive impact on reporting compliance"); see
also Alm & McKee, Audit Certainty, supra note 95 (finding that informing
individuals that they would be audited increased their compliance).
247. Joel Slemrod et al., Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of
Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455,
457 (2001).
248. Id. at 482.
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when the tax law is uncertain. 24 9 However, cash business taxpayers engaging
in tax evasion are not dealing in uncertain tax law. Instead, they are flouting
clear obligations, such as an obligation to include in income all payments
they receive. 2 50 As a result, they are unlikely to gain much bargaining
leverage by lowering their reported tax liability. Additionally, unlike in the
Minnesota experiment, cash business taxpayers subject to an enforcement
project would not be totally sure they would be audited. As a result, in
response to an enforcement project, taxpayers may feel additional pressure to
report high enough tax liability to avoid the very high chance of audit
attention resulting from the enforcement project.
Finally, concentrated enforcement could present some compliance or
political backlash. Some scholars have worried that strong enforcement
strategies can produce compliance backlash by crowding out taxpayers' non-
deterrence motivations for compliance. 2 5' The uproar (by some) over the
IRS's alleged targeting of Tea Party groups has also underscored the serious
political liabilities that can accompany perceived targeting of taxpayers. 2 52 In
the cash business context, it might be easy to take sincere (or less sincere,
politically motivated) offense at the IRS engaging in focused enforcement
projects on hard-working small businesses.2 53 Indeed, in an apparent
249. Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, supra note
33, at 532-34 (exploring how "[r]eporting less tax liability becomes more attractive
as a negotiation tactic in case an audit actually occurs as uncertainty increases").
250. I.R.C. § 61.
251. An oft-cited study of crowding out is Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A
Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (2000) (detailing crowding out in daycare
pickups). More generally, tax compliance scholars have worried that increasing
deterrence mechanisms might crowd out nondeterrence motivations for tax
compliance. See, e.g., Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices, supra note 19, at 704-05
(discussing crowding out as a "real concern" in tax enforcement).
252. Any number of recent press stories underscore this point. For early
coverage of and reaction to the events, see, for example, John D. McKinnon &
Corey Boles, IRS Apologizes for Scrutiny of Conservative Group, WALL ST. J., May
11, 2013, at Al, Republicans Slam IRS Targeting of Tea Party as 'Chilling,'A Form
of Intimidation, FOxNEWS.COM, May 12, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2013/05/12/rogers-irs-targeting-tea-party-and-other-political-groups-intimidation,
and Jonathan Weisman, I.R.S. Apologizes to Tea Party Groups Over Audits of
Applications for Tax Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2013, at Al 1.
253. Small businesses often serve as an effective rallying cry. See, e.g.,
Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why is Small Business the Chief Business of Congress?, 43
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Eyal-Cohen, Chief Business of Congress]
(discussing small business favoritism).
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response to the Tea Party scandal, an IRS official recently felt compelled to
declare that the IRS uses a "highly automated" system.2 54
Beginning first with compliance backlash, in some ways this concern
would be a bit misguided in response to concentrated enforcement. As
stressed previously, concentrated enforcement does not involve increasing
total enforcement against cash business taxpayers. Nor does it involve
increasing penalties. Instead, concentrated enforcement is actually premised
on the assumption that neither can be increased substantially. Nonetheless,
part of the appeal of concentrated enforcement is that it may make
enforcement seem more salient, which for all intents and purposes may be
perceived as an increase in enforcement.
Assuming that concentrated enforcement would be perceived as an
increase in enforcement by cash business taxpayers, it is difficult to know
how much to make of the concern that enforcement could crowd out non-
deterrence motivations to comply. Some scholars have expressed significant
concern about enforcement crowding out non-deterrence motivations.2 55 On
the other hand, Leandra Lederman has made a persuasive case that
enforcement can be consistent with, and necessary for, maintaining norms of
compliance.2 56 The high evasion in the cash business tax sector provides
some indication that cash business taxpayers currently are not highly
motivated by norms of compliance and that compliance backlash may not be
257
great, or at least not as great as in other sectors.
Perhaps the most troubling concern is not the potential for
compliance backlash, but rather political backlash, arising out of distaste for
a non-uniform enforcement approach. In some ways, the application of
concentrated enforcement in the cash business tax sector does not seem
particularly likely to raise concerns over focused enforcement. Cash
businesses are profit-making enterprises. They are not engaged in the type of
political activity that some believed made perceived targeting particularly
offensive in the Tea Party context. Additionally, concentrated enforcement
254. Hoffman, IRS Doesn't Target, supra note 42; cf Adams & Webley,
VAT Compliance in the UK, supra note 195, at 205-07 (registering complaints in the
United Kingdom that VAT may unfairly burden small businesses).
255. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to
Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367, 380-81 (2002); Dan
M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REv. 333, 340 (2001);
Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices, supra note 19, at 704-05; Richard D. Schwartz &
Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 274, 299-300 (1967).
256. Lederman, The Interplay, supra note 24, at 1484-99; see also Bruno S.
Frey, Tertium Datur: Pricing, Regulating and Intrinsic Motivation, 45 KYKLOS 161,
176 (1992) (suggesting that crowding out is less of a concern if enforcement efforts
are concentrated on dishonest taxpayers).
257. See supra note 242 for a discussion of potentially greater concerns
about compliance backlash in other sectors and potential responses.
388 [Vol. 16:6
Concentrated Enforcement
would operate through rotating enforcement projects throughout the cash
business tax sector, meaning that cash business taxpayers (or at least cash
business taxpayers who are in relatively high risk subsectors, should such
nodes of noncompliance be identifiable) may receive relatively equal
enforcement attention over the long run.258 Moreover, the DIF score, which
has not been subject to particular political criticism or concern regarding
targeting, itself uses a targeted approach, focusing on individual taxpayers
believed to be most noncompliant. As a result, while concentrated
enforcement would broaden the focus of enforcement from individuals to
groups, it would be applying a new type of non-uniform enforcement, rather
than introducing it altogether.
Nonetheless, whether for self-serving reasons, or as a result of
genuine outrage, some may react swiftly and strongly to even the perception
of IRS targeting.259 For instance, the recent initiative by the IRS alluded to
previously, which involved sending letters to 20,000 small business owners
questioning whether they had underreported their business income, received
prompt media coverage. 2 60 The media coverage highlighted various
objections by small businesses and their accountants, who indicated that they
found the initiative "alarming," that they "really work hard . . . to . . . not
only follow the law, but follow the letter of the law," and that the initiative
"created some heartache for the small business community."26 1
On the one hand, rhetoric alone should not be persuasive, to the
extent that it is opportunistic. Powerful rhetoric about the need to protect
small businesses has historically been used to gain political traction to defeat
tax reforms. 262 For instance, rhetoric regarding the need to protect small
businesses and family farms proved particularly effective in opposing the
estate tax at the beginning of George W. Bush's presidency, even though the
rhetoric was notoriously overblown.263 One lesson from the estate tax
258. Cf Lando & Shavell, The Advantage, supra note 91, at 216
(suggesting that ."concern about inequity can presumably be met by focusing
enforcement effort first on one group and then on another, so as to achieve equal
treatments of individuals over time").
259. For an interesting discussion as to what might animate distaste for
strong enforcement against cash business taxpayers in particular, see Bankman,
Eight Truths, supra note 219, at 510 ("What may play a role in our moral intuitions
is . .. that some portion of the benefit of underreporting in the cash sector is realized
by consumers.").
260. See, e.g., John D. McKinnon & Siobhan Hughes, Small Business in
IRS Sights, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2013, at Al.
26 1. Id.
262. See Eyal-Cohen, ChiefBusiness of Congress, supra note 253.
263. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:
THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 50-51, 62-66 (2005); Karen C. Burke
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experience (and the many other experiences in which protecting small
businesses has been used as a rallying cry) is that simply cowing to the
rhetoric may undermine reasonable tax policy discourse. Tax policy or, in the
case of concentrated enforcement, tax enforcement, that makes sense should
not be foresworn simply because of calls of unfairness toward small
businesses, especially when such calls may not be justified.26 Additionally,
in the compliance context, if the calls of unfairness are largely bluster,
outweighed by increased compliance and perhaps general confidence in the
IRS, the calls should not merit much of a response.265 In terms of defending
the program, to the extent that nodes of noncompliance can be identified, the
IRS can explain that enforcement projects are determined efforts against
particularly noncompliant groups of taxpayers. The IRS could explain that it
had gone through extensive analysis in deciding which subsectors were most
noncompliant and therefore would be subject to enforcement projects at any
266
given time. Doing so may weaken adverse reaction by the public, but not
provide so much information so as to inoculate any cash businesses subsector
from concentrated enforcement.
On the other hand, some might have deeper concerns about
concentrated enforcement as it relates to administration of the law. In
particular, one might reasonably worry about the impact of concentrated
enforcement on compliant taxpayers who are nonetheless part of an
enforcement project. This concern is far from straightforward. Such
taxpayers may feel a fair amount of distress regarding the prospect of being
subject to an enforcement project, even if they are fully compliant. However,
to the extent that concentrated enforcement ensures significantly greater
compliance, that significantly greater compliance may outweigh the prospect
of such taxpayer distress. Greater compliance can ensure greater fairness in
relative tax burdens and provide compliant taxpayers a greater opportunity to
& Grayson M.P. McCouch, Turning Slogans Into Tax Policy, 27 VA. TAX REv. 747,
754-55 (2008).
264. Cf Roy Bahl, Reaching the Hardest to Tax: Consequences and
Possibilities, in TAXING THE HARD-TO-TAX, supra note 40, at 337, 354 (stating in
concluding remarks on volume regarding the "hard-to-tax" that "everything depends
on the willingness of the government to enforce the tax system").
265. Cf Adams & Webley, VAT Compliance in the UK, supra note 195, at
205-07 (reporting from interviews with small business proprietors in the United
Kingdom that most believed strong agency powers were necessary for compliance).
266. Cf FACTORS INFLUENCING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE, supra note 201
(using DIF analysis to identify low-compliance communities). This report was able
to identify low-compliance communities by geography and to identify industry
groups with high noncompliance. See id. at 23 (identifying industries that tended to
be noncompliant), 31 (mapping low-compliance communities based on geography).
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compete in markets they might otherwise be priced out of.26 7 Government
officials can emphasize that concentrated enforcement is an important means
of ensuring that taxpayers pay their tax obligations and that it is designed to
root out tax evasion, not honest taxpayers.268 The IRS could also indicate
that, even for taxpayers in subsectors subject to enforcement projects, if they
are compliant, then they will not be subject to enforcement penalties. Indeed,
to the extent that the IRS continues to focus on taxpayers in a given
enforcement project based on "worst-first" methodologies, compliant
taxpayers may not even be subject to scrutiny.
Even more broadly, concentrated enforcement may raise questions
about when it is justifiable for a tax enforcement agency to engage in
innovative compliance campaigns, rather than simply act as a revenue
collection agency.269 However, this last, intriguing question can be left for
another day. This Article has made the case that, under certain
circumstances, concentrated enforcement can increase tax compliance, and
has fleshed out how concentrated enforcement might apply to the particularly
problematic cash business tax sector. Considering when concentrated
enforcement might increase compliance is a pressing question in light of the
project-based enforcement that exists in practice. By considering the
compliance benefits of concentrated enforcement, this Article has taken the
first, but certainly not the last, step in evaluating concentrated enforcement.
Future work and experimentation should follow.
267. See Bankman, Eight Truths, supra note 219, at 507-08 (describing
consumers, rather than cash business tax evaders, as beneficiaries of evasion);
Benshalom, Taxing Cash, supra note 181, at 74 ("[Ta]x-evasion practices force
otherwise honest taxpayers who operate in cash-sector activities to misreport their
income to align with market practices or to seek different employment opportunities
where they can compete without evasion.").
268. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86 for examples of strong
defenses of the HMRC campaigns and their importance in a fair tax system.
269. For some (preliminary) discussion of this issue, see supra note 107.
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